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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND METHODS USED
The problem. Recognizing that the Timaeus of Plato has
been subjected to a number of varying interpretations throughout
the centuries, —explanations which extend all the way from the
grossest literalisms to the most fantastic attempts to allego-
rize—the preliminary task which confronts the writer is that of
defining or determining the basic line of argument used in the
dialogue. Indeed, probably no similar piece of literature (with
the possible exception of the Genesis of the Judaeo -Christian
Old Testament) has suffered more at the hands of its friends,
—
and this, largely because of failure to grasp the basic argument
which Plato set forth. The first aspect of the problem, there-
fore, is that, without regard to the idiosyncratic and often ex-
treme suggestions of former commentators, the Timaeus be re-
examined in an attempt to discover exactly what Plato said. Is
the Timaeus merely a platonic Bible of disconnected proof-texts
to be quoted in support of various and sundry doctrines of re-
ligious mystics, poets, and philosophers, or is there a basic
line of argument upon which even philosophers may agree? it
will be assumed that there is such a basic argument which
should form the least common denominator of any exposition of
the dialogue in question. Therefore, the question arises, what
was Plato's purpose in writing the Timaeus? What is the main
thrust of his argument? What is the central problem of the
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dialogue, and what is the hypothesis which Plato brought forward
as a possible solution for this problem?
A mere determination of the fundamental course of Plato's
argument is only a beginning, however, for there are certain
great monumental works relative to the Timaeus which also demand
consideration such as the Timaeus Locrus
,
Aristotle's De Caelo
and De Generatione et Gorruptione
,
Plutarch's Generatio Animae
Timaeo, Ritter's Untersuchungen liber Platon
,
Lutos lav/ski ’ s Ori -
gin and Growth of Plato ' s Logic , as well as a host of other no-
table works. Furthermore, a review of the platonic literature
of the centuries reveals such pioneering works as Chalcidius’s
translation and commentary up to 53c, the commentary of Proclus
(extant as far as 44d), T. H. Martin's Etudes sur le Timee de
Platon, and Archer-hind’s translation and commentary which up
to two decades ago was still the standard work in English par
excellence
.
The year 1927, however, saw the completion of A. E.
Taylor's monumental opus which was immediately recognized not
only as the greatest in its field since that of Archer-Hind but
even as far superior to it. Since, in a project of such lim-
ited scope as this, it would be next to impossible, and proba-
bly of somewhat questionable profit to seek to delve into the
more ancient works on the Timaeus , —although it is recognized
that there is a veritable mine of material available to any
student whose interests are directed along paleographical
lines
— ,
this study centers largely upon Taylor's now famous
commentary. An attempt will be made to discover professor
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3Taylor' 3 distinctive approach, the specific aspects of the
Timaeus which he deems worthy of particular emphasis, and the
peculiar principles of interpretation which he has employed.
While, obviously, a great improvement upon previous
works and the recognized product of unquestionably thorough
scholarship, Taylor's commentary was not to remain the unques-
tioned champion of its field, for 'the somewhat comfortably
secure reign of a decade was challenged in 1937 by the publica-
tion of F. M. Cornford’s Plato 1 s Cosmology . Likewise the prod-
uct of thorough scholarship, Cornford's work is worthy of close
study by the contemporary student of the Timaeus , Thus, in
addition to an examination of Taylor's work, frequent reference
will be made to this later work, in an attempt, as with that of
Taylor, to discover the particular standpoint of the author, his
special emphases or interpretations, and finally what principles
he has employed as the fundamental guides to his exposition of
the platonic cosmology.
Simply to analyze these two standard works of Taylor and
Cornford in isolation would be to miss the great opportunity of
comparing and contrasting the views of two great scholars of the
present day. Upon what principles of interpretation are they
agreed? How does the basic thought of Plato's own argument
fare at the hands of Taylor and Cornford? Have they been able
to contribute any new interpretations or distinctive answers
to the problem which the great poet-philosopher propounded?
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4finally, since the works of Taylor and Cornford are
hardly the Law and Gospels of cosmological metaphysics, criti-
cisms of the two interpretations will be proposed. In addition
to this, certain original appraisals and interpretations will be
applied to the great cosmological problem which has one of its
classic formulations in the Timaeus of Plato.
Purpose
.
The purpose of this project is that, through
an examination of the commentaries of Taylor and Cornford on the
basis of a close study of the Timaeus itself, it may be possible
to ascertain whether or not the dialogue rightly may be consid-
ered a serious attempt on Plato's part to furnish the scien-
tific-philosophical world with a genuine cosmology. If it is
decided that the Timaeus is a genuine cosmology, the question
must then be asked as to the permanent value of this dialogue
as a cosmology, i.e., what great truths or metaphysical princi-
ples for the interpretation of reality are set forth and still
to be regarded as valid and, therefore, applicable in contempo-
rary science, philosophy, and philosophy of science.
Methods used
. In Chapters II through IV, the analytical
method is to be employed both on the Timaeus itself in determin-
ing the main line of its argument and on the expositions of
Taylor and Cornford as their distinctive interpretations are
pointed out. In Chapter V, as the findings and conclusions of
this study are set forth, the aim will be to present a synoptic
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5Gestalt of the dialogue as a whole in the form of an appraisal
of the permanent value and significance of the Timaeus as a
cosmology.

CHAPTER II
AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE TIMAEUS
6
That a ba3is for later criticism and discussion may be
provided, Chapter II will offer an analytical survey of the ar-
gument of the Timaeus
. This analysis will discuss, the relation
of the introduction to the argument of the Timaeus as a whole,
the author's approach to the problem, the problem itself, the
interpretation of the universe, including a discussion of the
soul of the world, the products of reason, the things which come
of necessity and the interaction of reason and necessity, and,
finally, the significance of the description of the making of
man. Only in view of an understanding of this fundamental plan
of the dialogue as a whole will it be possible to intelligently
discuss the distinctive principles of interpretation employed by
Taylor and Cornford which will be considered in Chapter III.
The relation of the introduction to the argument of the
Timaeus . In the introduction of the Timaeus, Plato has pre-
sented the dramatic background against which the problem under
consideration is to be discussed. The dialogue begins with the
discovery that one of Socrates
'
guests of the previous day is
missing. Socrates himself, of course, is present, as are also
Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates. The latter three gentlemen
are Socrates' hosts for the day. But as to who the missing host
is, the reader is left in the dark. While he probably will re-
main a figure shrouded by our own ignorance, it is of interest
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7ito note that of all the conjectures as to the identity of this
person, the suggestion that it may be Plato himself seems to re-
ceive the most unanimous approval from the critics. Yet this
suggestion is somewhat preposterous. Plato was born about 427
B.C. and this conversation probably took place around the year
421 B.C.i Thus, while it would be most satisfying to the curi-
osity to identify this unknown character, the suggestion of
Taylor (following Proclus) that even Socrates did not know his
name seems to be as satisfactory as any hypothesis which has
been offered to date, and certainly more reasonable than that of
Archer-Hind who seems to have set the ball rolling in the direc-
tion of the hypothesis that this person was Plato himself.
^
Whoever it may have been, however, the fact was that one of the
hosts was absent and thus the pleasant task of entertaining
Socrates devolves upon the three remaining hosts. After a re-
view of the discussion of the previous day, which is a condensa-
tion of the main argument of the Republic
,
Socrates, being
deeply moved by the discussion of the ideal state, is prompted
to give vent to his feelings.
I may compare my feeling to something of this kind:
suppose, for instance, that on seeing beautiful crea-
tures, whether works of art or actually alive but in
repose, a man should be moved with desire to behold
them in motion and vigorously engaged in some such ex-
ercise as seemed suitable to their physique; well, that
is the very feeling I have regarding the State we have
described.
^
1. Archer-Hind, TP, 54ff. and Taylor, OPT, 45.
2. Bury, Tim.
, 19B.
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8Following several minutes spent in mutual admiration by the four
men (a technique which Plato very skillfully uses to introduce
the other members of the dialogue), Critias, particularly desir-
ous of satisfying the longing expressed by Socrates, relates a
tale which he heard as a boy from the lips of his grandfather.
Originally, the story was reported to have been heard by Solon
during his travels in Egypt. This tale now is recognized as the
familiar classic, the legendary war and destruction of Athens
and Atlantis, which critias only presents in brief outline for
Socrates’ approval. Upon receiving his approval, Critias is
ready to begin a more complete account of the story. But, says
Critias
,
seeing that Timaeus is our best astronomer and
has made it his special task to learn about the
nature of the Universe, it seemed good to us that
he should speak first, beginning with the origin
of the cosmos and ending with the generation of
mankind.
3
Following the narration of Timaeus, the plan was that Critias
would pick up the conversation and give his contribution to the
dialogue. This being agreed to, Timaeus, after invoking the
guidance of the gods and goddesses, started his part of the dis-
cussion.
From this synopsis, it would seem obvious that the in-
troduction has little if any vital connection with the central
argument of the dialogue. To be sure, there is the problem,
which will be considered later, as to whether or not Plato was
3. Bury, Tim.
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recounting a genuine historical conversation.^ Thus it seems
reasonable that the introduction should be regarded as merely
the dramatic back-drop of the stage preparatory to the actual
statement of the problem in the body of the dialogue.
Plato * s approach to the problem . Not willing to drop
the reader suddenly into a labyrinthian maze of a partially de-
veloped argument, Plato is careful to provide two very clever
transitional paragraphs which are of important note. 5 Timaeus
clearly states that since they are about to deliver a discourse
\ „ \ . /
concerning the Universe tov tt&vtos Xoyo-vs), propriety de-
mands that all they say be approved by the gods in the first
place, and secondly by themselves. Therefore, it is their duty
both to invoke the aid of the gods and to invoke themselves to
insure a clear exposition (ey<^> Se f\ <£i.c*voo-£p.*L. r
1 Sv ) of
the subject before them. Finally,, as Timaeus begins to define
his terms, the reader realizes that he has been introduced to
the main topic of the dialogue. From this point on Timaeus is
delivering a metaphysical lecture. Not only because it is one
of the most famous passages of the dialogue, but because it con-
tains definitions, razor-like in precision and clarity, the
writer quotes the beginning of this splendid prelude to the
main problem.
4. Chapter III, 20, 21.
5. Bury, Tim. 27C-28A.
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The first problem, therefore, is the classification of
existence (not existence in the contemporary space-time sense,
\ A
but existence in the pure ontological sense, "isness" -- To ov as
opposed to To y iy v oyc & 'so v . . . <*e l) . The following statement by
professor Whitehead is an acute appraisal of the significance of
these two principles in Plato’s thought.
Plato found his permanences in a static, spiritual
heaven, and his flux in the entanglement of his forms
amid the fluent imperfections of the physical world.
Here I draw attention to the word ’imperfection. ’ in
any assertion as to Plato I speak under correction;
but I believe that Plato's authority can be claimed
for the doctrine that the things that flow are imper-
fect in the sense of 'limited' and. .. 'definitely ex-
clusive of much that they might be and are not. '
The lines... from the hymn ["Abide with me; Fast falls
the eventide."] are an almost perfect expression of
the direct intuition from which the main position of
the platonic philosophy is derived.
7
The unchanging realm of being is regarded as the higher of the
two. It is a realm characterized by objects of rational under-
standing which is expressed \ oyo^*)
,
i.e., in discursive
argumentation as in mathematics and dialectic which, alone,
according to Plato can yield a thoroughly grounded grasp of
truth and reality. Furthermore, it is pointed out that
6. Tim.
,
27D-28A.
7. Whitehead, PR, 318.
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rational understanding is always associated with a true account
of reality (ieu ^er^Xn&ov-s X^yov}
,
in contract to true opinion,
because it is diKoyov and can give no rational or reasoned ac-
count of its own nature. Moreover, said Plato through the mouth
of Timaeus, whatever becomes must have a cause. Summarizing
this approach, it is found that Plato has presented three dis-
tinct arguments as a basis for his later discussion. For the
sake of future reference, it may be well to enumerate these
three theses. First, that which is eternal is the intelligible
and, on the other hand, what comes to be is the sensible . Be-
cause the world is sensible
,
it must be a thing which comes into
being. Second, that which comes to be must have a cause. From
this, it may be drawn that the world had a cause, i.e., a maker
or father, but who because of his nature is difficult to dis-
cover. Third, only if the maker fashions his work after an
eternal model will it be good. Thus, since the world is good,
its maker must have utilized an eternal model . 0 Finally, it is
of interest to observe the distinction which is made between
So £oiand G'TTLtrTny.ry
.
The latter term, which is used several
pages later, refers to knowledge in the sense of correct under-
standing based upon accurate judgment, whereas
,
used in the
immediate context, regularly means a judgment which is not
8. Cf. Cornford's exposition of these three theses,
FC, 21-22.
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strictly true, but, at least partially erroneous. 9 Tt is thus
that To ycy vojx.ev'ov' may be spoken of (to use Parmenides's termi-
nology) as an object of opinion, ("the Way of Opinion”), i.e.,
ncreuj-S 4\fy>v> as opposed to "the Way of
Truth." The point which Plato has made would seem to be that,
while observing that all physical or scientific investigations
are marked by an uncertain and hypothetical character, the theo-
retical explanations which he has offered are to be regarded as
a summary of the best knowledge available de rerum natura .
^
Recognition of Plato's point of view here will be found of cru-
cial value in weighing one of the important problems with which
this 3tudy deals.
The interpretation of the universe
.
As has already been
pointed out, 27C is the real beginning of the 3o-called *bos-
mology" which constitutes the main body of the dialogue, as
Taylor observes, "from this point all pretense of conversation
is dropped. We are really listening to an unbroken scientific
lecture, a in its basic Hellenic sense." 1! Whatever
may be decided later by way of evaluation of the dialogue as to
the scientific worth of this cosmological section as exact
To So£v
9. Note that Taylor renders by 'belief' or 'judg-
- ment ' in the place of Jowett's (as well as Bury's) 'opinion.'
Whitehead observes that "Taylor's translation brings out the
Platonic influence in Descartes' Meditations
,
namely Plato's
Sotrk is the Cartesian judicium . " Whitehead, ?R, 126, n.9.
10. Bury, Tim
. ,
6.
11. Taylor, OPT, 59.
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science, one should, at least, grant that in the dialogue as
such, this section is obviously intended as a lecture in meta-
physics.
Upon concluding the introductory, yet nevertheless im-
portant distinctions and definitions of terms, the narrator pro-
ceeds with an exposition of the soul of the world. The cause of
becoming had been labeled as a perpetually sustaining cause, a
maker or father of the universe, who is difficult to find and
"impossible to declare unto men." This maker eventually is rep-
resented as a craftsman (S^yn-ov^yos ) who by following an exter-
nal model was able to produce the visible world. The motive for
the Demiurge’s creation of the world was that "all should come
so far as possible like unto himself." 12 From this point, 29D,
through 47E the general subject of discussion is the products of
reason. The soul of the world is the first of these products.
One world, not many, has been created and from this, it is drawn
that Plato intended that we view the universe as one integrated
whole. This whole, the body of the world itself, consisted of
four primary and fundamental bodies, viz., fire, air, water, and
earth. After a short transitional section (34a-B), Timaeus
brings his hearers face to face with the composition and struct-
ure of the World-Soul, one of the most obscure concepts of the
entire dialogue. in composition, the soul was said to consist
of certain "intermediate kinds" of existence, sameness, and
12. Bury, Tim
. ,
29E.
.
,
.
r
.
.
•• '
•
-i . t? w. . t t
.
,r k riei - •
.
.
-
’
-
.
v -! J
,
-
'
.. t
,
-
<
.
14
difference. When compounded, the mixture resulting from these
"kinds" was divided in proportions on the basis of a musical
c An observation by professor Whitehead is apropos at
this point.
Plato accounted for the sharp-cut differences between
kinds of natural things, by assuming an approximation
of the molecules of the fundamental kinds respectively
to the mathematical forms of the regular solids. He
also assumed that certain qualitative contrasts in
occurrences, such as that between musical notes, de-
pended on the participation of these occurrences in
some of the simpler ratios between integral numbers.
He thus obtained a reason why there should be an ap-
proximation to sharp-cut differences between kinds
of molecules, and why there should be sharp-cut rela-
tions of harmony standing out amid dissonance. 13
From this the Demiurge then executed a system of circles which
represented the fundamental motions of the sidereal universe.
The act of compounding these motions of the soul with the bodily
framework was the signal for the world to begin its interminable
course of intelligent life. Tiraaeus concludes this phase of his
exposition by stating that, because "like knows like," the com-
pounding of the World-Soul out of Existence, Sameness, and
Difference, enabled the World-Soul both to know "unchangeably
real objects and to have true beliefs about changing things of
the lower order of existence. "1^
13. Whitehead, PR, 145.
14. Bury, Tim
. ,
35A-40C; Cornford, PC, 57.
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The products of reason
.
Strictly speaking, the Soul of
the world should be regarded as a product of reason. Because
Plato apparently regarded it as of such primary importance as is
evidenced by the extended space he gave to its discussion, the
writer has chosen to treat it separately. Besides the soul,
however, there are several other products of reason. There are
the celestial gods, the laws of destiny, the human souls, and
the human bodies. All three of these classes of beings are
products of the World-Soul’s creative genius. To the celestial
gods, the Demiurge delegated the task of creating the lower liv-
ing creatures. Human souls (i.e., their immortal part) were
created by the Demiurge in person, while the body of man was
fashioned by the gods whose duty it was ”to provide a residence
for the immortal part of the soul, which they [had] just re-
ceived from the hands of the Demiurge.” Upon concluding his
preliminary description of the creation of man, Plato turns from
a discussion of the products of the intelligence of the divine
Craftsman, and is now ready to treat the things which have come
of necessity.
The things which come of necessity
.
The problem which
Plato now sets forth is that of necessity or as he describes it,
\ / > /
’’Errant Cause” frrXskv^|*£vT» acred ) , and particularly in the present
context (48A-69A) as the Receiver or Receptacle (vrro&^n
)
# Back
in 30A, the Demiurge was described as taking over three classes
of beings, (1) all that was visible, (2) that which was not at
rest, and (3) that which was in discordant and unordered motion.
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Now, the concept of necessity gradually is being unfolded. It
is that to which purpose has to conform, or, if not to conform,
that against which it has to contend by the very nature of
things. Finally from 49A to 50A, the concept of necessity is
expanded to include the idea of a Receptacle. That which re-
ceives the tTSoVol
,
the vTYo^o'Xn is also described as the nurse
(T^o^os) of becoming. As nurse of becoming, it contains fire,
earth, etc., which are said to be names of qualities, not of
substances, i.e., they are not permanent, irreducible elements,
things with a constant nature. But how about the Receptacle it-
self? to call it matter would be a gross error, for observe
that it is not that things are made but that £v S qualities
appear. These qualities, moreover, are pictured as ‘'fleeting
images" as seen in a mirror. It is only to the qualities, not
N
to the Receptacle itself, that one can apply the word to to
cruj^Toec^
•
Besides this, there is the analogy of the
Receptacle to a mass of plastic material. Even Plato, however,
recognizes that his argument is limping due to the fact that
words of description fail him; His description only suggestively
approximates the true reality.
^
The interaction of reason and necessity
.
The very nexus
of the problem which is under discussion is the interaction of
reason and necessity. At the beginning of the section on the
things which come of necessity (43a), we have a brief adumbra-
15. Bury, Tim.
, 50a -C.
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tion of the struggle between reason and necessity. This sum-
mary, it is important to note, forms the hub of the entire prob-
| lem of the Timaeus . Previously, in another of his writings
Plato had hinted at the concept of a teleological universe.
The Timaeus is an attempt to provide such a concept. While
Anaxagoras had introduced his world-ordering yo xts, he had failed
to employ it as a causation principle. Plato, on the other hand
is here ready to come to grips with this knotty problem of cau-
sation. Therefore, he has distinguished between cause proper,
i.e., final cause, and auxiliary cause, i.e., the sura of neces-
sary physical conditions. In this connection, there enters the
related problem of the interrelationship of
>
vows
,
and
jTrfccSuj. The treatment we have at hand thus promises a thorough-
going study of some of the basic questions concerning man and
the universe, all of these questions being discussed on the
basis of a teleology. What is to be the outcome of this strug-
gle between rationality and irrationality? is it to be an end
characterized by purposive, teleological action or "errant
cause?" is the end to be the victory of chaos or cosmos?-^ in
answer to this host of questions, Plato suggests persuasion
(~TTe^&u> ), as the means by which reason deals with necessity
and to a certain degree brings it under rational control.
16. Plato, phae
. ,
96A.
17. Cf. Brightman, Art. (1939)

18
The significance of the description of the mak ing of man .
The final section of the dialogue concerns the making of man’s
soul and body. 1 ^ The anatomy and physiology of man are de-
scribed (69A-81S), followed by a discussion of the pathology of
man's body (82A-86A), and the pathology of man's soul (86B-90D),
and finally, with a generous supply of Rabelaisian humor, closes
with a portrayal of the human reproductive system, what now is
the significance of this unique section of the dialogue? Did
Plato offer this chiefly as a contribution to the knowledge of
the medical world? If he did intend this section to be taken
primarily as a physiological treatise, then the writer sees
nothing unusual in it at all. What Plato has presented here was
the common medical knowledge of his day and offers little, if
any, advance upon the findings of Hippocratic medicine. For
this reason, the writer is of the opinion that Plato presented
this discussion chiefly because it offered him a capital illus-
tration of the very problem he was treating. Thus, while there
is an even more significant meaning of this section which the
writer will treat later, on its face value, a more accurate
and meaningful title would seem to be "Man and the Struggle be-
tween Reason and Necessity." That is, Plato has concluded his
dialogue with a somewhat fantastic, yet nevertheless very prac-
18. Bury, Tim
. , 69B-92C.
19. Chapter IV, 79-96.
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tical, illustration of his basic problem, the interaction of
reason and necessity, in terms of man's struggle to maintain a
state of physical and mental health. In short, the Tlmaeus is
Plato's supreme attempt to provide the scientific -philosophical
world with a cosmology which, teleologically, discusses reality
in terms of reason and necessity in constant interaction, an
interaction which is operative in every phase of the universe,
even to being experienced in the life of humanity in its strug-
gle against the forces of "errant cause," "brute fact," or ne-
cessity in attempting to maintain a healthy equilibrium of mind
and body.
In retrospect, the final sentence of the Timaeus col-
lects the loose ends, observes the dialectical path which has
been traveled, and closes with that beautiful and significant
term expressive of the unity of all reality
,
j-tovoy ev va s
,
i.e.,
"the uniquely born," "the only -begotten, "
—
quite a contrast to
the
,
Wo,T(>e<-S of 17.A. with which the dialogue began.
/
<St\ 'To-0 'Tpavros VyV hSn Tov
Xovov ny^v
^
'K/(3 ujv Ko^l. o'St o' Kob-foo-s o-tr~r~uj
4
<Z av o^Tav jna, o ~tt tVo v, €cku)v
ieoS dlo'(5hTos ae/Lcnos Kai clpco-rb-s kAXi o-v-olsTje
K«*v. T(rAtu»T*.T05 j$yov/ev 6u crv- (JolVO S oXfe Y-
20. Tim., 92C.
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CHAPTER III
THE DISTINCTIVE PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
EMPLOYED BY A. E. TAYLOR AND F. M. CORNFORD
20
That an academic rivalry exists between A. E. Taylor
and F. M. Cornford is obvious even to the casual reader who
picks up their famous commentaries on Plato's Timaeus . 1 Wherein
the two scholars differ, what principles are at stake, and what
concrete interpretations of the Timaeus result from this differ-
ence of opinion are the problems with which this chapter seeks
to deal.
The treatment of the introduction of the dialogue
.
The
first serious difference of opinion between Taylor and Cornford
occurs in their treatment of the historicity of the conversation
which Plato related as having taken place at the residence of
Socrates. It is the claim of Taylor that this was an actual
historical event, that Timaeu3, Hermocrates, and Critias—all
historical personages—were entertained at the home of Socrates,
and that the cosmological problem which we have treated here
was the product of Timaeus and not of Plato. Cornford flatly
rejects this hypothesis for which he sees no good supporting
evidence. While he does recognize the possibility of Taylor's
theory, he is quick to deny its probability. With such a diver-
gence as this it is not a surprise to find a radically different
1. Alfred S. Taylor, CPT and Francis M. Cornford, PC.
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attitude upon several rather crucial issues. This difference in
points of view has resulted in two contrasting approaches to
several problems which both are ready to admit constitute the
philosophical message of the Timaeus.
Approach to the problem . G-rowing out of their basic
difference of opinion as to the historicity of the conversation
related in the dialogue is the problem of its cosmological
thesis
.
2 How did Plato (or Timaeus, if Taylor is to be followed)
intend that this discussion be taken? is it science or is it
mere poetry? While both Taylor and Cornford recognize the sec-
tion from 27C on as a metaphysical lecture, they are, at once,
at odds as to whether the discourse is meant to be exact
science. in addition to this, they must settle the problem of
what really does constitute exact science. The immediate point
at issue rests, of course, on the interpretation of the passage,
CV \ / \>/\ /#*>«,,/ '
-r- *CutrTe TT~<r^ <v ~To-^TlOV Tov €LKoToi ToV ^VC>oy ^TTo^e/o|<.6Vovs TT^eTT€LHovrTorv-.. .
>/ / \ -2
^Tc ire tn~re-
c
^ Taylor seems to think that Plato means
the account to be taken as "likely” in the sense that we take
modern science as an "approximation” of reality. Taylor's con-
clusions on this point of interpretation are as follows:
We conclude, then, that the model ) on
which the physical world is constructed is 'eternal'
but that the world itself is mutable.... Accordingly,
it will be a rule of method that
7
'discourses ' (\oyo<_)
about the model must be final c );
discourse about the mutable copy cannot have this
2. Cornford, PC, viii, ix.
3.
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> ^
finality, and therefore not ‘exact* (olK^'.(<3 6'-s, cf.
the of c 6), and we must be satis-
fied by an approximation to finality, and exacti-
tude which is as close as we can make it ( £^.v'
<£e Vos 'Ntt'ov’ £LKox"asjAyJ~TTUv’ 7(^n c 7)*
As we should put it, pure logic and' mathematics...
are exact science and finality of statement can be
reached in them; physics, as an account of the em-
pirically existent, must be content to be progres-
sive and provisional.... The accuracy of the obser-
vations is dependent on the limits to the discrimi-
native fineness of our senses, and on the delicacy
of our ‘instruments of precision', and again we have
no absolute guarantee that observations made under
what seem identical conditions at different times
will always yield identical results..,.
This attitude is practically equivalent to that of contemporary
philosophers of science. 5 Cornford, however, on the other hand,
believes that this nearness to truth has nothing to do with the
modern notion of ''approximation," indicated in Taylor's state-
ment that "the accuracy of the observation is dependent on the
limits to the discriminative fineness of our senses." Stating
Cornford 's view more fully:
These sentences [i.e., the paragraph of Taylor
which was quoted above] come from a passage which
professes to state plato's conclusions, 'as we should
put it'. If all that Plato meant by calling physics
4. Taylor, CPT, 73.
5. For a clear statement of this attitude in terras of
an epistemology which views all knowledge as the product of an
experiencing self forming mental concepts or schemata which must
be constantly revised as new evidences are presented, interpre-
ted on the basis of a philosophy of levels, see Werkmeis ter
,
PS,
22-48, 514-527. Cf. also Whitehead, PR, 11. "The bundle of
philosophic systems express a variety of general truths about
the universe, awaiting co-ordination and assignment of their
various spheres of validity. Such progress in co-ordination is
provided by the advance of philosophy; and in this sense philos-
ophy has advanced from Plato onwards." How like Plato I
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a likely story' was that natural science must always
be provisional and progressive, we should expect him
to state what he believed to be the nearest approxi-
mation to truth yet attained, not to be content with
'the best approximations to it which could be ex-
pected from a geometer-biologist of the fifth century'.
Yet Tr. represents this as 'all that is required by
his own principles that his speaker's theories 'shall
be more or less "like" the truth'.°
Upon examining the evidence which Taylor and Cornford
have assembled, the writer can see no great line of difference
between the two scholars at this point despite Cornford 's exten-
sive quibbling. This example of a disagreement between the doc-
tors does, however, at least, serve to demonstrate the tendency
of cornford to be hypercritical of every pronouncement of
Taylor's where a difference of opinion is possible. in this
case, what may be at issue (if this is more than just the ex-
pression of an academic rivalty) is an attempt on Cornford'
s
part to break Taylor's confidence in his theory that Timaeus may
have been an historical character setting forth his own views
rather than a dramatic spokesman for Plato's views. ^ Whatever
may be underlying the issue, however, it would seem to be ob-
vious from the text of the Timaeus itself that a cosmology is
"likely" when it is seeking to explain To yiy /. . . d<&L
which by its very nature demands that the investigator be in the
constant act of revising his conclusions.^ "Exact" science,
6. Cornford, pc, 30, n.
7. See discussion of this on pp. 20,21.
8. Plato, Tim.
,
28A.
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therefore, on the basis of the text oan only come from observa-
\ A > \
tion of ~To o N/olnand even here as in the case of mathematics
(which itself belongs to the field of the rational given but
which may be applied in a world where the principles of an
irrational given are also in force), from man's standpoint, we
may have different sets of "schemata" (Werkmeister) which in
themselves may be consistent but are by their very nature lim-
ited when applied to the physical world. ^ Thus, the writer is
of the opinion that, viewed both from the text of the Timaeus
and from the standpoint of modern science, Taylor's interpreta-
tion of Plato at this point is essentially correct in spite of
the dubitability of the historicity of the conversation within
the dialogue and the dust which Cornford has consequently
raised.
Perhaps a more basic difference in viewpoint is that
which is revealed in cornford 's criticism of Taylor's eisegesis
of Christian monotheism in interpreting the platonic 8<=o>s. This
is a more serious charge than any which Cornford has as yet
made. 1 ^ Obviously Taylor has interpreted the Timaeus in terms
which also belong to Christian monotheism. Cornford is correct
thus far. Where Cornford may be wrong is in his own blindness
in not recognizing that after all there is a great similarity
between Plato's thought as represented in the Timaeus and some
9. Contrast, for instance, Euclidian geometry with the
revolutionary geometries of Lobatschewsky and Bolyai.
10. Cornford, PC, ix.
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of the basic concepts of Christian monotheism.^ While this is
not the place to offer a criticism of these two views, any
interpretation of platonism in the terminology of the Christian
religion is nevertheless rather a dangerous feat and Cornford
may be correct in saying that Taylor has over-emphasized an
otherwise admitted similarity.
A further divergence between the views of Taylor and
Cornford centers upon the interpretation of the mathematical
sections of the dialogue. it is Taylor’s contention that the
mathematics of the Timaeus reflectsa very definite Pythagorean
influence. An adequate interpretation of the Timaeus is thus
impossible without a preliminary acquaintance with and under-
standing of Pythagoreanism. Now undoubtedly Plato was under the
influence of the teachings of the Pythagoreans. Y©t, the extent
of this influence is quite another matter and Cornford* s criti-
cism of Taylor's insistence upon delving back into Pythagorean-
ism for the basis of his interpretation of the Timaeus is well
taken. 12
The final variation in the approach to the dialogue is
revealed in Cornford *s criticism of Taylor’s interpretations of
space and time. Taylor, says Cornford, has been too prone not
11. It is the clear testimony of the history of Chris-
tianity that much of its terminology is borrowed from Neo-
platonism which, incidentally, had some of its roots in this
very dialogue of the great poet-philosopher.
12. Cornford, PC, ix, x.
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only to use the scientific terminology of Alfred North Whitehead
but to read Professor Whitehead's philosophy of science into the
Timaeus
.
Once again it is necessary for Taylor to plead guilty.
But the interesting point to note here is that Dr. Whitehead
again and again has acknowledged his debt to Plato on this
score . 13 Cornford may be right. Perhaps Taylor has read much
of Whitehead into the Timaeus but if cornford wishes to criti-
cize him for it, this also involves a criticism of Whitehead's
evaluation of Plato's scientific cogitations.
The Demiurge
.
Plato's concept of the Demiurge
(Sh^iov^y
)
seems to be one of the most serious bones of con-
tention between Taylor and Cornford. Cornford is fairly caustic
in his criticism of Taylor at this point. ^ The first of
Cornford’s charges is that Taylor has misrepresented the
Demiurge by capitalization of which is frequently used in
the Timaeus with reference to the Demiurge. This, says
Cornford, is taking too much for granted. Furthermore, Cornford
claims that Taylor has represented the Demiurge or Secss. as an
object of worship. ^5 a s far as the writer has been able to
ascertain, this is a false charge. Nowhere does Taylor say just
this although it must be admitted that the word implied an
13. A cursory examination of either Whitehead, PR or
AI will amply substantiate this contention.
14. Cornford, PC, 34-35.
15. Cornford, PC, 35-36 and Taylor, CPT, 78.
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object of worship in the mind of the average Greek. 10 But,
after all, it was Plato who used the word. Does it not seem
that the emphasis which Plato placed upon this (^eo-s and the
manner in which this was singled out was sufficient reason
for Taylor's capitalization? While it may be that Taylor has
overstated matters in his enthusiasm and because of his prej-
udices in the direction of Christian monotheism, 1^ it does seem
to the writer that Comford's picture of the Demiurge is that of
an emasculated &£o-s, a conception which Plato himself would have
had difficulty in recognizing. A more adequate criticism of
these two opposing views will be presented later when the writer
offers his own interpretation of the nature and role of the
Demiurge in the platonic cosmology. 1 ^
The execution of the works of reason . By way of ap-
proach to an exposition of the execution of the works of reason,
it may be well to inquire into Plato's basic use of the concept
of causation in the dialogue. On the surface, it would seem
that Plato is picturing the rational v/orld as the direct product
16.
Yet, note Tim
. ,
27B-C (object of prayer for divine
guidance) and 29A (God is good and, therefore, a suitable object
of worship).
17. Note that professor Taylor is a strong churchman.
It has been a striking tendency for the theologians and philos-
ophers of the Anglican Communion to express their philosophy of
religion as a synthesis of platonism and Christianity. It is to
be wondered at that Professor Taylor has succeeded so well in
holding in check his religious preferences!
18. Chapter IV.
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of the Demiurge and to a certain extent this is true. Yet,
while it is true that the argument may be best conveyed by the
image of the divine maker, portrayed as distinct from his model,
materials, and work, it is Cornford’s belief that Plato
here warns us not to imagine that, in using the
image, he has declared the true nature of the
cause. It is to be taken not literally, but as
a poetical f igure . . . .What the sustaining cause
is, Plato does not tell us and could not... with-
out stepping outside the framework of the very
myth he is constructing.
^
Obviously, this is one of Cornford 's basic reasons for objecting
to Taylor’s argument as wishful thinking. Perhaps, however,
this careful reticence on Gornford'3 part is just as well.
Excessive enthusiasm might have again presented the reader with
the question as to what held Atlas up or what sustained the four
elephants at the corners of the earth*. But clarity of the pres-
ent exposition suggests a return to the point under immediate
discussion, the execution of the works of reason.
As a whole, the section 29D to 47D deals with the works
of reason. Since this discussion includes a. treatment of the
concept of the Demiurge, it is not strange that Taylor and
Cornford should also blend the discussion of the two subjects.
Cornford’s alert tendency to catch Taylor reading into Plato
some of his theological presuppositions has already been noted.
Yet, Taylor is not the only one who has so sinned, if we wish to
call it such. On one occasion, at least, the tables can be re-
19. Cornford, PC, 27.
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versed. Conford not only waxes theological; he is almost bib-
lical! Says Cornford,
The kernel of Plato's ethics is the doctrine
that man's reason is divine and that his business
is to become like the divine by reproducing in his
own nature the beauty and harmony revealed in the
cosmos. . .
,
20
Far from suggesting that Cornford has misinterpreted the Timaeus
it is only right that we admit his interpretation as correct.
It seems quite obvious, however, that Cornford, whether he knows
it or not, has been driven to interpret Plato in terminology
which is very close to that of the Christian Church. 21 Taylor
and Cornford, then are essentially agreed in regarding the works
of reason as the product of a rational will or, at least, a
rational factor in the universe. That part of the world which
is visible, both (along with Plato) recognize as "a living
creature made after the likeness of an eternal original." it is
only the ideal living creature in the world of Forms, "not to be
identified with any species of animate being, but embracing the
20. Cornford, PC, 34.
21. Compare the terms of his
26, 27. Note, too, that the LXX uses
uses) in translating
.
statement
> \
t LKcjl> V
with Genesis 1:
(the very word Plato
22.
Cornford, PC, 39. •
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agreed that Plato intended his emphasis upon one world rather
than many to be a symbol of rational organization as over
against the absence of such ordering.
The World -Soul . The World-Soul is described as a compo-
sition of certain intermediate kinds of Existence, Sameness, and
Difference. These constituents are compounded and the resulting
mixture divided on the basis of the proportions of a musical
harmonia. From this the Demiurge constructs a system of circles
representing the elementary motions of the heavenly bodies.
Perhaps, most significant is the possibility that the
interpretation of God as being a part of a larger whole may not
be absolutely necessary. Indeed, if the same principle is
applied to the divine reason in the world and that divine reason
which is symbolized by the Demiurge, confusion results.
Cornford calls attention to this fact.
Gan we simply identify the two? in that case the
Demiurge will no longer stand for anything distinct
from the world he is represented as making. The de-
L
sire for goodness will then reside in the World-Soul. . .
.
This, says Cornford, is not Plato's intended meaning. Yet may
it not be possible to preserve the distinction which Cornford
desires when the pluralistic aspect of Plato's universe is
recognized? In this sense, the Demiurge or God may still be
23. Cornford, PC, 33-4-3, and Taylor, CPT, 75-86.
24. Cornford, PC, 39. Note that this is the basic
principle of Archer-Hind's pantheistic interpretation.
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conceived of as a part of a larger whole and yet distinct, i.e.,
a part distinct from the various other parts.
The body of the universe, as such, is not a mere reduc-
tion to extension. It still contains motions and active powers
which, not produced, i.e., instituted by the divine reason, are
eternally producing undesirable effects from the point of view
of reason. Cornford comes to the conclusion, as does Taylor,
that since Plato has represented all physical motion as having a
living soul as its ultimate source, "these bodily motions and
powers can only be attributed to an irrational element in the
World-Soul.
"
2
^ This is just about as far as Cornford is able to
go, however. While he may have made a contribution in specify-
ing the locus of the irrational element (although this is not at
all new) as the World -Soul, he has not really said much thus
far. It remains for Taylor to present an elaborate exposition
of the problem. Unfortunately, however, Taylor centers his very
full discussion on an attempt to maintain the thesi3 that there
is no void outside the cosmos for Plato any more than for
Aristotle, a thesis which he supports by introducing one of his
favorite hypotheses, namely, that Plato is attributing to
Timaeus a "development within Pythagoreanism which repudiates
prominent features of the original doctrine. "26 The exposition
of Taylor is complicated further by frequent references to
25. Cornford, pc, 176.
26. Taylor, CPT, 100, 131
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numerous ancient and modern interpretations of the subject plus
a tendency to translate Timaeus' doctrine into the terminology
of Alfred North Whitehead. 2 ^ since this Chapter is concerned
principally with the distinctive features in the interpretations
of Taylor and Cornford, expediency would suggest that the writer
forego any attempt to set forth their conceptions of the World-
Soul completely, and to pass on to the more important (at least
as far as the basic line of argument is concerned) concept of
the Receptacle.
Necessity and the concept of the Receptacle . One of the
major problems which now looms upon the horizon of this study is
that of adequately defining the concept of the Receptacle
(vtto ) . What can the Receptacle of the be? What is
meant when the Receptacle is described as the 'nurse' (-r^o/5® 3) of
becoming. In the Timaeus
, 49A-50A, Plato offers the first
approach toward an answer when fire, air, earth, etc., are
considered as the contents of the Receptacle. These are said
to be names of qualities, not of substances, i.e., they are not
27. Such a concept is not peculiar to Plato. Cf.
Plutarchus, Nor. In De Iside et Qsiride where the Receptacle is
under discussion, the goddess Isis is described as yearning for
form as a woman for a child. Plutarch (Mor.
,
372E,F.) relates
this concept with Plato's "gentle nurse (49A, 51A)
,
the all-
receptive." He describes her as having "an inate love for
[Reason] which is identicle with the good" for which she yearns.
This is apparently a misunderstanding of Plato's concept of the
Receptacle, the single concept being split between Isis who
yearns for the good and Typhon who is evil incarnate. In De Et,
inscripto foribus tempi! Delphici
,
chap. 19
, p. 3922, the
Receptacle is identified with time. in De Animae procreatione
(5, 1014B-D; 7, 1016c -F; 21, 1022E-1023A; 23, 10243-24, 1024c;
26, 1025F), the Receptacle appears again as "inner matter."
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permanent, irreducible elements, things with a constant nature,
as were the atoms of Democritus and Leucippus, for instance.
Thus far, Plato has in a general way been primarily concerned
with the rational or final cause of the o-v^v'o-s. He, moreover,
has specifically attempted to show how this general plan of the
ov^<*vos is the answer to the purpose of the Demiurge in making
the "best of all possible worlds." it is at this point that
Plato wishes to delve deeper into the problem to examine more
closely the workings of the machinery of the universe by which
this purposed result is achieved. That is, Plato now treats
three problems: (a) the theories about the molecular structure
of the four ‘roots
,
1 (b) the chemical composition of the bodies,
and (c) the tissues of the living organisms. As Taylor points
out, the argument is now lifted to the plane of ‘positive*
science. ° previously the existence of the four roots had been
assumed as an hypothesis from which the consequences (i.e., a
divine intelligence making a universe by the best possible
combination) might then be deduced.
Of important preliminary importance is Plato’s positive
implication of his belief in a real theism. Unfortunately,
Cornford has so emasculated Plato’s conception of the Demiurge
that his appreciation of this theistic belief of Plato is neces-
sarily limited. The interpretation of Taylor is thus not only
more cogent from Plato’s point of view; it is more inclusive.
28. Taylor, OPT, 311-315.
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Observe, the terminology of 47E: vo-O* , ,
,
c?L
J du/^yKns y^k'^K.<£i/0{. Mote too that Plato makes a change in
verbs. The significance of this is simply that the effects of
the v'ot^s are ’’the works of its hands, M that is, Plato is dealing
literally with God’s handiwork as contrasted with mere occur-
rences from ivbiyKti
. It would seem, contrary to Cornford, that
once more we have a clear indication of genuine purpose ascribed
to God, a real theism which Plato was attempting to propound.
That the Vovs is not always absolutely successful in the
achievements of its purposes seems obvious. The concept of
irrational necessity or Receptacle in the Timaeus is Plato’s
supreme attempt to wrestle with this problem. From the argument
of this dialogue it would seem clear that in a majority of cases
the va\rs is successful. 29 Whatever success is achieved, how-
ever, must always come as VoOs works in combination with or even
in spite of necessity (IvJyKn). Plato’s famous statement of
this principle is as follows.
To
^
yuV ov/ TTo<.^<£\
^ L «tw. <- T~U TJk Vcfis £c Snj^c oise yr>
Kau -r-o< Sl owoLyKtis ytyy<$y*-ei/oi ~r£> ' X oyT
c
.
jA.£ j/-cy o'&v' u'To'v-Sz. 'kc
(
y<C VC'Z'l.S "T£. K<i u v'Orv- Cr*l/Cr~7oLcr£ <*y<?t/y'h£>b7.
vov <$> T~&>~7r^QeC [/
Sj^vo ^jtvu>\/ Vot 'TrXcHcr'Toi ^'rrT'-r^ &y€cv
Tdvrn k<aToI -roi^'T'^ -re i>rro
~rT£u5)»'0-^ <3-#~rvo
^
-v ^cCryzcr’o
~r6S<C
KoVy^o-v/'
29. Yet in his old age, Plato seems to have become much
more pessimistic than he formerly had been. The accumulative
irrationalities of man and nature had somewhat soured the great
poet-philosopher. Cf. Laws, 906a.
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To ~TT^V . ^lTls O'&v' & y Gvovfc , K^tX T«IVT<^ oTTu/S
t^fcLj p<-*KT£Ck'/ KcM. To.jr\S 'T\dr^|^£k'ns <ftOo S dUTCot-S,
n y>££t<-S ~1T(£c/> t/'K£.i/ .30
The necessity which confronts the Nous is described as
'irXoL^potv'n durruat , or to use Cornford’s rendering, "errant cause.”
It is a factor in the universe which is not caused by reason.
Earlier in the discourse, Plato (or Timaeus
,
if we are to follow
Taylor) had assumed the four roots as ultimate. Now, however,
as Taylor observes, this preliminary working hypothesis is to be
/
Corrected by an account of their which turns out to be
an analysis of their respective molecules into simple geomet-
rical cons tituents
.
”32 The selection of these roots (which is
the task of the Nous or Demiurge) is characterized by the pick-
ing out of geometrical forms from infinitely numerous possible
configurations in space. It is on this basis that Plato can
accurately describe this premature state of &tt£.l^oV with
which the Demiurge begins as the c*crt< .
Is it correct to conceive of this ordering of the
Universe from chaos or more accurately from 'rr\t*v'u/p-/v'n o*Itw as a
chronological progression, i.e., from chaos oitrrc* )
to roots, to ordering? probably this is an over-simplification.
Rather does it seem that this action is conceived of as somewhat
synchronous and eternal. The constant interaction of Totas and
30. Bury, Tim
. ,
48A.
31. Of. Demos, pp, 106, "passive cause” and Whitehead's
concept of "process” (in PR) as change with the conscious initi-
ation of purpose.
32. Taylor, CPT, 303.
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ivoi^Kh (to use another of Plato’s terras) is inherent in the very
nature of the universe.
What now are these roots which Plato mentions? Appar-
ently, as has been implicitly assumed in the earlier part of the
dialogue, they are ultimate. Does not Plato call them o~rocy(e2di
To9‘'Trav'ro-s , i.e., the ABC’s of the universe? Yet the very
specific purpose of this section of the dialogue is to make a
fresh and more intensive analysis of these very
Indeed, as will be presently seen, this new analysis goes far
beyond any mere analysis of the universe into four primary ele-
ments. in this, both Taylor and Cornford are agreed, particu-
larly the former whose treatment of this section is remarkably
/
thorough in its detailed analysis. Plato proceeds to give an
answer to the problem which has just been raised. As Taylor
shows, formerly,
our immediate purpose was simply to distinguish
the eternal form from the passing, so we could
work with a new pair of antithetical forms,
operating between VowroV which is model or pattern
and the ^icr<9i~>-ro v which is
,
copy.-^
Now, however, analyzing the four roots, themselves, it is found
that they are sensible bodies. Moreover, the peculiarly dis-
tinctive qualities of these roots, now are discovered to be
dependent upon the geometrical stamp of their particles. Says
Taylor (whose analysis is much more acute than Cornford' s at
33. Bury, Tim
. , 47s.
34. Taylor, CPT, 312.
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this point), "we have to get back to the notion of shape and
voluminousness as something common to all the roots." The
student of the problem is thus forced to regard the filling of
a volume with "a definite contour as just as much a fundamental
and universal character of nature as the filling of a duration."
Thus Timaeus now positively identifies corporeality with the
filling of a contour.^ The three basic terms which are in-
volved in this process may be listed as follows:
(
1)
Holf^£eLy
,
the pattern or model;
( 2 ) vnro
,
or to give the other terms used to
d^scribe^ the Receptacle itself, the matrix
(eyuodi yeZoV ), the mother (yc^rm^), and the nurse
) of all becoming;
(3) (a union of 1 and 2), the 'passing copy'
(a qualified event or complex of events percep-
tible through the senses.)
While adding to his descriptive repertoire of the
Receptacle by an illustration in terms of a piece of gold which
a man constantly shapes, Plato now is faced with the problem of
the corporeality of the Receptacle. But is it corporeality?
If one is to take the illustration in its gross literalism, it
is, yet one does well to remember that the work under considera-
tion is the artistic product of a poet-philosopher, probably,
Plato reasoned as follows. Volume is one of the things which
can be considered as permanent. It never changes its character
for the good reason (which Taylor alone points out) that
volume—"the volume in which passage a3 a whole occurs... has no
ies
.
35 . Cf. Descartes' similar conception in later centu-
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figure to change. This then is the secret: it has no figure
or shape of its own. Similar to the clay of the potter de-
scribed by Jeremiah, it only has shape or figure as it yield-
357
ingly receives it from the artificer or potter. ‘ in this
sense, the which otherwise might be thought of in
terms of crass literal materialism is rather a sort of spiritual
substitute. Comford, as well as Taylor, is emphatic in his
insistence that "we are to get rid of the notion of material
substance. ”39
in their comments upon 50B, both Taylor and Cornford
wisely stick rather close to Aristotle’s criticism of plato at
this point. Timaeus is not represented as saying, after the
illustration of the gold that the V'Tro §0^* is a sort of stuff
and that "what we commonly call the 'coming to be' or 'ceasing
to be’ of fire, water, and the like, is really only a qualita-
tive change (iVko^Jerc-s ) of the more permanent stuff." Rather
does Timaeus refer not to a material substrate or stuff but to
a real y<SV£-cn.s and y? of m* . Furthermore, this illus-
tration is only applied to cases of alteration of an already
pre-existing ' substance ‘J
36. Taylor, OPT, 321.
37. Jer.
,
18:1-6.
38. Bury, Tim
. , 50A.
39. Comford, PC, 181.
40. Taylor, CPT, 323; Cornford, PC, 182-184.

39
What now is the final description of the Receptacle?
Very fortunately, Plato gives his own descriptive summary so
that there is neither room nor necessity for personal interpre-
tations on the part of either Taylor or Cornford. To begin
C \
with, the must not be called matter, simply because it
is not that o& things are made but that ev <i> (not things) but
qualities appear.^ Note that these qualities are pictured as
’’fleeting images” as seen in a mirror. Thus Plato is not now
dealing with To as earlier in the dialogue but with
To
.
4
- Moreover, it is specifically to the qualia
themselves and not to the that one can correctly
apply this term To oru>^<5CToe»-££ <s
. a second preliminary observa-
tion is that the is represented as formless ) >
i.e., in a sort of plastic state. Thus when Plato finally comes
c - /
to summarize his description of the vtto^o
,
he gives four
terms (not all new), two negative and two positive. Note that
he begins this summary with a £10 £h which goes on to cut di-
rectly across the roots of the former cosmologies of Thales,
Anaximenes, Heracleitus, and Empedocles. Plato is now through
with such terras as earth, fire, water, etc. The -vnroSo^A he
says is in contrast to all these; (Note the force of^-XK^
.) it
is v
. #*yoT> voryTOT?.
The distinction which is made here between the suchlikes is
41. Bury, Tim
. , 50A,B.
42. Cf. Bury, Tim.
, 33B and 36e.
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vital. 4 5 plato has progressed from mere sense perception to
that which is only apprehended by thought, in this case,
’•extension. ”
The three ultimate factors in the making of the
Universe, therefore, are as follows. First, there is the
pattern or which is (a) exempt from all passage, (b)
apprehended by thinking, (c) imperceptible to senses {dv*(.tr£)nTer )•
/
Secondly, there is the which is (a) implicated in pas-
sage, (b) that which passes, and (c) is known through the senses.
Finally, there is the -J'rro&o'Xn itself which is (a) a
,
i.e.,
a room or space, (b) that in which passage is situated or occurs,
(c) does not itself pass, and (d) is apprehended by a ’bastard*
kind of thought (^tTnrav' \oyto-^c<J>Tc/c voc9cJ ). As Taylor summa-
rizes this statement of explanation from Plato, the point
singled out for special emphasis is
that space, though not a is like a
in not being in the making, ... and
also in not being apprehended through sense,
though that which does apprehend it is of a
peculiar kind. ,4
As for the term
,
this is defined as a name for that which
has the character and function already specified. Says Taylor,
”we are to assign to space the character and function already
43. Contrast suchlikes (G-r.To Tolo^-to/
,
Lat. quale
,
i.e., quality as immediately experienced as distinct from form
as rationally defined) and the ideas (objective Universe. Cf.
Whitehead’s ’’potentials , ’• ’’eternal objects.” Tim
. 523,
44. Taylor, CPT, 342.
,.
•
*
i : .
i - •
•
*. #
•
,
.
. ; .
. ;
j .. .
....
.
t
i
<
<
'
'
... ...
. o j . s.
' u. j rn (
.
.
.
.
41
described and no other.” [Note the similarity of Kant’s doc-
trine of space here.!
In summary then, Plato has presented the following con-
ceptions Of the irTToS^h .
(1) a state of irrational confusion, confused motion;
(2) a form, in the sense of an idea, a definition or
rather the object defined;
(3) passivity (the receiver--vTT-©<£x^ );
(4) the nurse (tl <9hVn );
(5) a raging fire (49b), etc.
(6) the <X> of qualities, i.e. , the seat of
irrational qualities;
(7) invisible (&vo^-re>v elSos );
(8) unshaped ); y
(9) all-receptive )>
(10) characterized by intelligence or perceived by a
sort of intelligence (ro^ von-ron> )
;
(11) space, room (^^ )
.
Obviously, the subject has not been exhausted and never will it
be. The student of cosmology is here faced with Plato's ’’given.'
What is meant by a ’’given” and how is one to treat it in a
philosophical system? Professor Taylor answers these questions
in the following very able statement.
In the real world there is always, over and
above ’law,’ a factor of the ’simply given' or
’brute fact, ’ not accounted for and to be accepted
simply as given. It is the business of science
never to acquiesce in the merely given, to seek to
'explain' it as the consequence, in virtue of
rational law, of some simpler initial 'given.
'
But, however far science may carry this proce-
dure, it is always forced to retain some element
of brute fact, the merely given, in its account of
things, it is the presence in nature of this ele-
ment of the given, this surd or irrational as it has
sometimes been called, which Timaeus appears to be
personifying in his language about necessity.
*
45. Taylor, PLA. quoted in Whitehead, pr, 67, 68
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Thus it is well to note Plato's statement of philosophical
humility for the present and his challenge to future investiga-
tion and thought. 40
y
£ 0“Te^o v
TTe(>\. dvrov . it may be observed that both Taylor and
Cornford are in agreement on these basic principles of interpre-
tation of the Receptacle. The parting of the ways comes (1)
when Taylor begins to interpret space and time on the basis of
Whitehead and (2) when Taylor holds to the complete subordina-
tion of the Receptacle to the persuasion of reason (interpreta-
47tions to which Cornford explicitly objects). ' The disagree-
ment, therefore, in the latter case concerns the work of the
Receptacle and its control by reason rather than the nature of
the Receptacle itself.
Time . Time, Cornford describes, in the terminology of
Plato, as "the moving likeness of Eternity." It "cannot exist
apart from the heavenly clock whose movements are the message of
Time." Divided into three 'forms,' past, present, future, "Time
'moves according to number, ' being measured by a plurality of
recurrent 'parts,' the periods called day, month, year." These
units of measurement are necessary to anything which is to be
46. Bury, Tim
. , 49A, B.
47. Cornford, PCC, xi, xii, 176. "It is true that
) Professor Whitehead ha3 been profoundly influenced by jowett's
translation, and that his eternal objects have a definite affin-
ity to Plato's eternal Forms. But there is more of Plato in the
Adventures of ideas than there is of Whitehead in the Timaeus .
"
Relative to the subordination of the irrational, Cornford says,
"It is here that I differ from Professor Taylor, who holds that
the subordination is complete."
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called Time. Furthermore the existence of these units, in turn,
is dependent upon the regular revolutions of the heavenly bod-
ies, "the motives of the celestial clock.” Since neither Time
nor the Heavens can exist independently, i.e., in separation
from the other. Time is described by Plato as having "come into
A Q
being together with the Heaven. " ° Furthermore, Cornford finds
that Plato's treatment of Time is in direct contrast to his
treatment of Space. Our tendency, he says, is
to speak of Becoming as going on 'in time and space',
as if these two conditions were on the same footing.
Plato does not so regard them. Time is here included
among the creatures of the divine intelligence which .
orders the world. It is a feature of that order, not
a pre-existing framework. Space on the other hand,
is introduced in the second part of the dialogue,
under the heading of 'what happens of Necessity'....
[The] Receptacle, finally identified with Space
(52A), is treated as a given frame, independent of
the Demiurge and a necessary condition antecedent to
all his operations. Time is not a given frame; it
is 'produced' by the celestial revolutions (38E),
which are themselves the work of the Demiurge. it
is true that the existence of Space is implied
throughout all this description of the world's soul
and body; but its existence is due to Necessity,
not to Reason. 49
The preliminary conclusion at which cornford arrives is simply
that Space is the conditio sine qua non of Reason's production
of the visible order. Time on the other hand is a feature of
that order, to be regarded as "inherent in its rational
structure.
"
•
CO
• Cornford, PC, 97, 102.
49. Cornford, PC, 102-103.
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That Plato should view Time as inseparable from periodic
motion Cornford finds is not a novelty in Greek thought. Fur-
thermore, Plato was following the traditional conceptions of
Greek philosophy when he spoke of Time in the terminology of
spherical movement. This is a ’’more abstract, unsubstantial,
phantom-like” concept than Space. To quote Cornford again,
”What fills Space is body that we can see and handle; what fills
Time is movement, and above all the movement of life; the very
word dLuW means both ’time’ and ’life’.”^0
Turning to Professor Taylor's analysis of Time, it is
noted that he prefaces his discussion in the body of his running
commentary with the statement, that this description of the
creation of Time is
of course... not to be taken literally, since it would
then imply the absurd consequence that there 'was a
time' v/hen as yet there was no time. The real object
is to explain the relation between time and eternity
(oi luts), Plato’s formula being that time is a 'moving
image of eternity' (€ck<w klvkt-os [37d])....
We must note that we are told at the outset that Time
was created to make the world 'still more like' its
original. ... That is, Timaeus means to insist, not on
the hackneyed contrast between time and eternity, but
on their positive resemblance. 51
Strangely enough, the prefatory remarks just quoted are
about all Taylor has to say at this point by way of a definitive
description of Time. to be sure, Taylor traces the main points
of the platonic argument and even goes on to contrast the notion
50. Cornford, PC, 103.
51. Taylor, CPT, 184.
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of alternate cycles, "or rather half cycles, of growth and decay
of the and "the view that all processes within the
Kocr^os from the revolution of the oirftWves to the life-history
of an insect have their rhythmic periods” with the doctrine of
eternal recurrence as propounded by the Stoics and Nietzsche.
"There is nothing to show that he [Plato] held that the whole
cosmical process as a whole is cyclical or that he believed in
the ’point-to-point' repetition of any series of events like the
Pythagoreans of whom Sudemus speaks, or the Stoic3 or Friedrich
Nietzsche. Thus to obtain Taylor's distinctive opinions on
the subject of Time, it is necessary to turn to the Appendix of
his commentary . 53 This is the famous passage to which Cornford
so strenuously objects.
What now are the essential features of the Taylorian
interpretation of Time? Basicly, Taylor connects tempore.lity
with To ytyvo^tv'ov'
,
i.e., "'what is in the making', 'the un-
finished', as contrasted with that which is once and for all it
can be, the 'eternal' Cro Thus, he holds that the
platonic doctrine of Time is similar if not synonymous with
Whitehead's concept of the 'passage' of nature. Time and events
are inseparable. "Where there is nothing 'going on' there is
not time." On the basis of this reasoning Taylor concludes that
Ti me is of the physical nature of the Universe since nature is
52. Taylor, CPT, 190.
53. Taylor, CPT, 673-691.
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’’the complex" of To y
cy
vof-cevov . Although they are not strictly
physical events, Taylor also observes that reasoning, choosing,
feeling 'go on' or 'take place*. in view of this, he declares
that passage extends beyond nature although it, in some sense,
belongs also to man's inner life. in contrast to this, to
intelligence (votas ) as such, he finds that 'passage' does not
apply. Thus far, Taylor’s exposition seems to be quite conso-
nant with the argument of Plato although it is obviously pos-
sible to press too far the analogy with Whitehead's 'passage'.
From this point on, however, Taylor wanders far from the Tiraaeus.
The basic platonic description of Time linked up with the
Whiteheadian concept of the 'passage' of nature is used as a
springboard for a long excursion into Neo-Platonism, Scholasti-
cism as represented by Saint Thomas Aquinas, Christian theology,
Whitehead, Russell, Leibniz, Newton, Descartes, the Michelson-
Morley experiments of 1887 and 1905, etc. The discussion is
coramendably thorough, but it is little wonder that Cornford
raises a loud objection. The net result of Taylor's ten pages
of research seems to be the conclusion that Plato rightly dis-
tinguishes between time and the fundamental 'passage' of Nature
itself. "Time is not the same thing as
y
or to ytyveT^L
but a numerical 'measure' of it." Furthermore, Taylor is bold
to claim that it is upon this distinction between time and
'passage' that the whole recent development of modern science
rests and "as the uniqueness of order in time is only implied,
not actually affirmed, his account fTimaeus'] could be adopted
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by an exponent of the ’Theory of Relativity'."^ A section of
Taylor's concluding paragraph is worthy of quotation.
If we keep firmly before our minds the difference
between the actual 'passage of Nature' and the repre-
sentation of it in a given space -and-time system, and
the contrast between the plurality of these systems
and the unity of the 'passage' itself, v/e shall see
the full happiness of the phrase that time is a ' mov -
ing image of eternity'. 'passage' itself does not
'pass'. It is a permanent character by which Nature
is distinguished from what is above Nature. Thus
Nature itself in its concrete reality may be said at
any rate to belong to aevum . But when we try to rep-
resent the passage of Nature in the time -system cor-
related with our space-system, to get a perspective
of it, what v/e get is an endless series of occurrences
in an order which v/ould not be the same for observers
with a different space-system. Every system of meas-
ures depends on the arbitrary selection of a special
TYoO o~ru>
,
and therefore we cannot create a system which
starts from no one particular TTov u*Yu> at all. The
view of Mature we could get by pursuing science for
ever v/ould, after all, be only one among an infinity
of equally legitimate perspectives, all differing.
Such a view is exactly what Timaeus calls it, a shadow
,
and a 'moving' or 'variable' 3hadow of the eternal. 55
Taylor's argument is typically thorough and certainly cogent,
yet it is easy to see why it is not convincing to such a mind
as Cornford's. Taylor has unquestionably made several broad
assumptions and at times rather far-fetched analogies which
demand more than a small degree of faith. Yet, it must be
admitted that the argument is an interesting correlation of
ancient and modern cosmologies worthily provocative of thorough
study and discussion.
54. Taylor, CPT, 689.
55. Taylor, CPT, 691.
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Space
. A like situation exists with reference to the
two expositions of Space which Taylor and Cornford have pre-
sented. The former gives little by way of a definitive descrip-
tion of Space in his running commentary but rather relegates his
discussion of this topic to the Appendix where he first con-
trasts the platonic view with the Aristotelian doctrine of
Space, and then tries to equate it with the doctrines of
Whitehead which he claims are attempts to get bs.ck from
Aristotelian positions to the general standpoint of Plato’s
Pythagorean cosmologist. ^6 cornford on the other hand is con-
tent to stick fairly close to an exposition of the traditional
Platonic argument without venturing off on any of the many
seductive tangents which constantly tempt any reader of Plato.
Examining first, the views of Cornford relative to
space, it is noted that they are included in the body of the
text of his commentary on the Timaeus.57 cornford finds that
"three facts are here contrasted in three aspects." To begin
with, Space is described as 'everlastingly existent and not
admitting destruction’. "Plato’s purpose," says Cornford, "is
precisely to introduce Space as an eternally real object, to
fill the blank left by the totally non-existent in Parmenides’
56. Taylor, CPT, 677. Note that this discussion is
largely dependent upon the assumption that Timaeus was an
historic person.
57. Cornford, PC, 191-200.
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scheme, which consequently provided no support for any world of
appearances
.
"58 Secondly, Cornford notes that Space is appre-
hended, "not by the senses, but ’by a sort of bastard reasoning’,
and is 'hardly an object of belief'. All Plato means by this is
that Space is not sensible since it cannot be seen or touched.
Neither is it intelligible since it has no status in the world
of Forms.
Space is rather a factor in the visible world; and
yet it is everlasting and imperishable, and can only
be apprehended by thinking: so it 'partakes of the
intelligible in a very puzzling way' (5lB).5^
It is possible, as Cornford suggests, that Plato may have had in
mind the process known today a3 'abstraction' —"thinking away
all the positive perceptible contents of Becoming until nothing
is left but the 'room' or place in which they occur." Thirdly,
Cornford remarks that the Form is contrasted with Space "in that
the Form 'never receives anything else into itself from else-
where', and with the copy in that 'it never itself enters into
anything else anywhere
'
.
" Ultimately, Cornford finds that Plato
has identified Space with the concept of the Receptacle. He
denies that Plato's Space is a void which remains entirely dis-
tinct from the particles moving in it. Rather does he think of
the Receptacle as "a Recipient which affords a basis for images
reflected in it, as in a mirror," a comparison which, he notes,
could not be applied to atoms and void. To be sure, Plato has
58. Cornford, PC, 193.
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described Space as a room (X«*k<0» i.©., a place where they are
in contradistinction to stretches or intervals of a vacancy
where they are not present. If Plato admits any void at all,
says Gornford, "it is only as the very smallest interstices
(SuaKtVoO which the shapes of particles, when particles have
been formed, do not allow them to fill. "59 This exegesis,
Cornford supports by a careful distinction between two G-reek
words. To-vto-s, be shows, is the word which refers to the place
when something is, whereas is To Iv &
,
a container, and has
a very close connection with meaning to 'hold* or ’have
„
,
60
room for
As noted above, professor Taylor has made his exposition
on the basis of a contrast with the Aristotelian doctrine of
Space. He finds that the account of Space offered by Timaeus is
much less open to objection than that of Aristotle. To begin
with, Timaeus ' theory has the advantage of not beginning with
metrical considerations. While it may be true that )(^<* is
metaphysically described as ircfcrps yev//creuj^ n!hro£a^(Vi and that
in which everything happens, no references are made to anything
like cubic capacity. x The epitome of Timaeus’ argument is
simply
59. Bury, Tim . , 58a, B.
60. Cornford, PC, 200, n. 2.
61. Bury, Tim.
, 49a, E.
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that every physical event happens 'somewhere', and
again that what happens here now is qualitatively
different from what happens here by and by, and
that, in virtue of these differences, vJ^cK receives
different configurations (cf. 50C 2 v Te v<<*\
^
l
h ^ ^ 'iriro Tujv tlri.ov'Tu^ / .)
That is, is primarily not that of which bodies
take up a greater or a less bulk, but that which
exhibits different configura-tions and different
’sensible' properties in its different regions.
, p
Situation and figure, not quantity are made primary.
Furthermore, while Taylor is willing to admit that 'projective
geometry' did not exist as a recognized science in the day of
Timaeus or even in that of Plato, he holds that Tiraaeus has
instinctively pitched "on the 'projective', not on the
'metrical' properties of figures... as what calls for recognition
when he introduces the notion of a 3 a third requisite for
his cosmology along with the and their sensible
Not content to limit himself to the problems which have
already been raised. Taylor goes on and admittedly translates
Timaeus’ doctrine of 3pa.ce into the language of modern philoso
phy of physics. He concludes that Timaeus
formally treats of time and space as distinct and
differing features of 'becoming' in different sec-
tions of his discourse. But owing to his freedom
from metrical prepossessions, he gives an account of
the T/vr-o the 'continuum implied in
becoming', which is such that it needs only to be
supplemented by the recognition that the continuum
has four dimensions and not only three to be still
appropriate. Aristotle's preoccupation with the
notion of volume, on the other hand, leads to the
62. Taylor, OPT, 676 .
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traditional isolating of space from time with all
the paradoxes it involves. This is why the latest
philosophical work on the concepts of physics, work
like professor Whitehead’s, strikes a reader familiar
with Greek philosophy at once as an attempt to get
back from Aristotelian positions to the general,
standpoint of Plato’s Pythagorean cosmologist. ^
Once again the writer must admit that the thoroughness
and cogency of Taylor’s argument is very impressive. Yet it
must be pointed out that his whole theory is only an hypothesis
which may or may not be true. Texts can be quoted on all sides
both for and against his argument. Furthermore, this hypothesis
rests on a former hypothesis, namely, that the argument being
presented is that of Timaeus, a Pythagorean cosmologist, rather
than that of Plato himself. it may be that Taylor is stretching
a possible hypothesis too far. That which is possible is not
always probable; likewise, one may say with Cornford that what
is cogent is not necessarily convincing.
The interpretation of reason and necessity in the con -
stitution of the human organism . Tbe co-operation of Reason and
necessity is exhibited in the work of the created gods. ’’Their
task,” says Cornford, ”is to frame the mortal parts of the soul
and the bodily organs to house them.” While Cornford is willing
to admit that henceforth ’’the interest of intelligent purpose
again predominates,” he is unwilling to grant Taylor’s claim
that reason eventually completely controls irrational necessity.
Outside of this basic difference of opinion, there is little
6
3
.
Taylor, CPT, 677 .
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disagreement between Taylor and Cornford. Both seem to be im-
pressed with (if not somewhat embarrassed by) the fact that the
entire section from 69A on is quite antiquated from the point of
view of contemporary anatomy and physiology. Yet, undaunted,
Taylor employs his usually thorough analysis, giving careful
64
attention to a tripartite psychology of man. Cornford, being a
little less adventurous, appears to join Taylor in uttering com-
ments of the broadest generalities relative to the so-called co-
operation [This is Cornford' s word. The writer questions its
usage. is it not an over-statement if not also an over-simpli-
fication of the situation?] of reason and necessity. ^ Aside
from the one difference of opinion already indicated, neither
Taylor nor Cornford seem to have developed any outstanding dis-
tinctive interpretation of the passage.
In retrospect, the writer observes the long road which
has been traveled. Several distinctive interpretative emphases
have been singled out. It has been observed that differences
between Taylor and Cornford have largely occurred in their dif-
fering approaches to the dialogue, their concepts of the
Demiurge, the execution of the works of reason
—
particularly as
to the extent of reason's control of necessity, and their dis-
agreement over any attempts to modernize the philosophy of
science on the basis of an at least implicit but positive
64. Taylor, CPT, 496ff.
65. Cornford, PC, 279ff.
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evaluation of the root principles of physics as found in the
Timaeus . With these distinctive points of view in mind it is
now appropriate that a critique he attempted of these conflict
ing interpretations as a whole.
,*
CHAPTER IV
A CRITIQUE OF THE INTERPRETATIONS OF TAYLOR AND CORNFORD
Cornfordian vs
.
Taylorian approach
. As was pointed out
earlier in this study,'*' professor Taylor has interpreted the
Tlnaeus on the basis of several distinctive hypotheses. The
most outstanding of these is the contention that the theories
set forth are not original discoveries of Plato but are the per-
sonal speculations of Timaeus. This basic assumption calls
forth another which is directly connected with it, namely, that
the philosophy of physical science presented by Timaeus "owes a
very special debt to two fifth -century thinkers in particular,
Empedocles and Diogenes of Apollonia. 1,2 Thirdly, it was ob-
served that Taylor traces a large section of the dialogue to the
Pythagorean science of the fifth century and interprets it from
that standpoint. The fourth distinctive feature of Taylor’s
approach is his attempt to equate the scientific utterances of
Timaeus with similar pronouncements of Aristotle and particu-
larly of professor Alfred North Whitehead.
That professor Cornford should oppose certain of these
hypotheses as ”a new Taylorian heresy” is easily understood.-^
1. Chapter III, p.
2. Taylor, CPT, ix.
3. Cornford, pc, viii. cf. also Xenophon’s refutation
of the view that the argument of the dialogue is that of Timaeus
rather than of Plato in Mem., IV, Chap. 3, sec. 13.
».
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I
To begin with there is no conclusive evidence to prove that
Timaeus either was or was not an historical personage. To build
an elaborate argument upon such shifting sands of higher criti-
cism, as Professor Taylor has done, can at best only be regarded
with suspicion. ^ As for Taylor's historical researches into
| fifth -century Italian Pythagoreanism, two comments are called
forth. On the one hand, it must be admitted that there is some
sort of 'an attempt to graft Empedoclean biology on the stock of
Pythagorean mathematics’-- this, in spite of Cornford's desire
to dispose of the theory in a wholesale manner .-5 On the other
hand, such a theory as this—even in view of the splendid array
j of Taylorian scholarship--should be taken as no more than it
actually is, simply a possible yet questionably probable hypoth-
esis. This latter remark is intended as being applicable to
both the Empedoclean and the Pythagorean aspects of Taylor’s
hypothesis. With regard to Taylor's attempt to retranslate cer-
tain of the concepts of the Timaeus into the terminology of
Whitehead, for instance, the v/riter finds this to be an impor-
tant as well as an interesting correlation. To be sure, Taylor
has exhibited a tendency to carry this too far and Cornford’s
remark that "there is more of Plato in the Adventures of Ideas
4. Note that Professor Edwin Lewis in his most recent
work, adopts the "Taylorian heresy." "The view is not Plato’s
own, but is set forth by Timaeus himself, speaking as a
Pythagorean scientist." Lewis, PCR, 213.
5. Taylor, CPT, 18: Cornford, PC, viii, ix.
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than there is of Whitehead in the Timaeus " is well -taken . 0 This
simply means that Taylor approached a very significant and prof-
itable study from the wrong direction; he has produced an
eisegesis rather than an exegesis. To read into the Timaeus ,
Whitehead's process and Reality and Adventures in Ideas is a
preposterous procedure. Yet it is quite obvious that Professor
Whitehead has not only been directly influenced by the Timaeus
but has admittedly drawn from it. It is the opinion of the
writer, therefore, that as far as attempting to ferret the
scientific aspects of the argument of the dialogue intended by
Plato to be understood by his readers is concerned, Cornford's
method of basing his commentary on the traditional assumptions
and his attempt to illustrate Plato's thought in the historical
setting of Plato's century, is by far the safer procedure,
although, to be sure, it is not the most colorful and challeng-
ing, simply because the novelty of Professor Taylor's distinc-
tive hypotheses is absent. Neither the presence nor the absence
of novelty, however, should sway the student in his search for
truth.
The writer ' s interprets. t ion of the nature and status of
the Demiurge , probably the most important difference of opinion
between Taylor and Cornford is with reference to the nature and
6. Cornford, pc, xi, xii. In fairness, however, we
must note Whitehead, AI, 192, 193. "The space-time of modern
mathematical physics, conceived in abstraction from the particu-
lar mathematical formulae which applies to the happenings in it,
is almost exactly Plato's Receptacle."
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status of the Demiurge. As has previously been shown, differ-
ences in one's concept of the Demiurge can radically condition
7the entire course of one's interpretation of Plato's argument.'
It is, undoubtedly, primarily because of Taylor's confusion of
the Demiurge with the G-od of Christian theism that he is unable
to admit with Cornford that reason never completely subordinates
or controls irrational necessity. It is in consideration of
these factors that the following interpretation of the Demiurge
is presented.
Of preliminary significance is the term which seems to
be Plato's favorite designation of G-od in action. This term.
Demiurge yos ) may, perhaps, be best rendered as
Artificer or possibly World -Artificer. The German equivalent,
Werkmeister
,
used by Apelt,® is very suggestive and obviously a
more accurate rendering of the original, i.e., "a master of
work.” Apparently, the Greek term, however, is of a proletarian
coloring. God is the people’s worker, their artisan, control-
ler. This latter connotation is inherent in the very etymology
of the word: Sny-a —
,
thus, the worker of the people.
The second basic designation of God is a term which
ultimately seems to have been meant as an equivalent of
Demiurge. Yet this second term stresses the mental activity of
7. Chapter III, pp. , 26, 27
8. Apelt, PDTK, Tim., 29E.
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God rather than God necessarily in action. The term to which
reference is made is Nou3 (vovi ) . Obviously this terra is sug-
gestive of the Nous of Anaxagoras. As the two terras are em-
ployed throughout the dialogue, Plato seems to view the Demiurge
as the living embodiment of Nous or reason. Thus the person of
the Demiurge is the living embodiment, the agency of the Nous,
the rational element in the universe.
The question is now asked, is the Demiurge a genuine
Creator in the sense that He brings things into being ex nihilo ?
This is obviously not the view which Plato is seeking to convey
to hi3 reader although one must admit that it is a not too un-
usual conception in popular Judaeo -Christian theology. Rather
does Plato portray the Demiurge as an agency for the bringing of
order to a universe of pre-existing chaos. The Demiurge simply
desires
( (
3 c>-^\o that "all should be, so far as possible,
like unto Himself. The motives for this willing are (1) that
He naturally prefers perfection to imperfection, (2) He is with-
out jealousy, (3) He prefers order to chaos, i.e., He goes
through a process of evaluation of perfection and imperfection,
order and chaos. This fact, moreover, is implied by Plato's
choice of verbs. It will be observed that he uses <_
which implies more strongly than $e\u> (which he would have used
if no deliberate or set purpose were involved) the deliberate
exercise of volition. Note that the similar statement of this
9. Bury, Tim.
, 30A.
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fact in penes is is merely descriptive of the state of the
Universe and of God's observation after the bringing of order
out of chaos.
C
\\ Se yfi hV c^v<^TV-cr Kfcv'c^crTas ... Ko(.l
'ii
_
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As Dr. Werkmeister points out, it is quite clear that the use of
’word* in the Bible is very definitely a raagico -religious use of
the term as designating the "medium through which the world came
into being. If there is any connection between the Hebrew
conception of the Universe being created by the Word of God and
the Greek idea of the Demiurge imparting rational ("logical,"
from \oyos
,
word) order to a preexisting chaos characterized by
undiscovered or otherwise (i.e., in the absence of the Demiurge)
undiscoverable relations, it may well be based upon an evolution
in the content of meaning from designating divine utter-
ance, fiat, to Xoyo-s
,
designating logical or rational content or
Koy<-c^<^s, denoting the psychological process of a dialectic—in
this connection designating a rational ordering of things.
Attention has previously been called to Professor
Cornford's objection to Dr. Taylor’s emphasis upon "God." One
.
reason for this objection seems to be due to Plato’s later usage
of the plural forms Beol and BtoU. instead of the usual term
Says Comford, it is impossible to "agree with Taylor's
10. Rahlfs, VTG, and Eittel, Bib. Heb.
,
Gen
. 1:2,10.
11. Werkmeister, PS, 113-114. Cf. Gen
. ,
1:3. Ps.
,
33:6; Heb . , 11:3; etc.
12. Bury, Tim., 39E-40G; Cornford, PC, 101-102.
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statement that 'all through the story there is only one God who
can be called everlasting, the Creator himself . ^e j_ s
referring, of course, to the \<du. ck£u>{ which include
the fixed stars and the planets and the earth as the most "ven-
erable of the gods within the Heaven," all these being of the
number of "rujv e,v as in the Republic
.
Mere point-
ing out of this fact, however, is not conclusive proof of
Cornford's objection and substitute thesis. While these living
creatures, even the heavenly gods themselves are endowed with
temporal life that moves in time and lasts throughout all time,
this is not the eternal duration (o»uju/) which was the primary
IS
characteristic of the model. J
Cornford's chief objection to the Demiurge described by
Taylor is as a personal God. This objection is offered on the
basis of an efficient God. if the Demiurge directs His view on
the final cause and attempts the best possible, then the final
cause is within the very nature of God. The mere fact that the
/
Demiurge is never characterized as (soul), is no reason to
reject the concept which is offered. Absence is no argument,
for the fact of the matter is that is often tied up with
the biological organism as in Saint Paul.
13. Taylor, CPT, 184.
14. Bury, Tim., 40B. cf. Rep
. ,
508.
15. Bury, Tim.
, 30C-31A.
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Among the numerous descriptions of the Demiurge, the
following offer a well rounded conception of His nature and
status. He is represented as
(1) the object of prayer for divine .guidance [Note
that when Socrates speaks of ou, it is Ka-rbi
Vo^oV
.
Timaeus speaks of <9eos
,
i.e., he is
not speaking of mere traditional, customary
gods but God (€>e6s).]; /
(2) the poet or maker (iroim-nV tov );
(3) the technician ( 6 );
(4) the Demiurge j;
(5) good, and therefore a suitable object of worship;
(6) God who desires good ( 6 (9eo«j );
(7) the begetting father (o
(8) the object of man's fear (To ev-rvrra
V
);
(9) morally blameless; ^
(10) the father of certain sons (iTon-^oj./Tr^L^e-s );
(11) concerned with the goodness of man. lb
To be sure, there is such a controversial phrase as Tcuv &'l£lL>v'
Qg(2v yesjovo-s ^ This is the only assertion of eternal
gods in the entire dialogue. Thus Taylor suggests that
here may come from 6)ei, an object of contemplation, i.e., eter-
nal ideas, although this word is also common to a religious
object. Furthermore, it is quite possible that ©gujv may have
been inserted either by Plato himself, or by a redactor, as a
tactful concession to polytheism.
16. Bury, Tim., (1) 27B-C, (2) 28c, (3) 28C, (4) 2SC
and 41A, (5) 29A, (W30A-C, (7) 37G, (8) 42A, (9) 42D, (10)
42S, (11) 422.
17. Bury, Tim
. , 37C. \
18. Taylor, CPT, 184-185.
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While there is a tendency on the part of some to suggest
that Plato was a polytheist (so hints Cornford-3*^) --one can un-
derstand his reason for so doing—Plato’s occasional shift from
o "to oL (9e-o<- oroicSecu. does not necessarily mean polytheism
but rather may be viewed as substantially monotheism. God may
be regarded as the ever-abiding basis of change to be observed
only as a theophany. This has a marked similarity to the
poGodhead and three persons of the Christian theistic Trinity.
While the fact that Plato does allow ©eol to creep into his
story (as in 37) gives the interpreter no little trouble, it is
significant to observe that when Plato is specifically describ-
ing the operations of rational purpose in the universe, he is
then very careful to speak of <9&os as the one who is the active
pi
agent of these operations.
As the Demiurge, God is pictured as possessing goodness
as His chief characteristic. He always aims at the very best
simply because He is the living embodiment of the good (He is
regarded as efficient cause). Even Cornford, who often is very
caustic, especially when reference is made to the religious
nature of the Demiurge, is willing to speak of man as a reflec-
tion of the divine nature of the Demiurge. Says cornford, in
a choice passage which has been previously quoted herein.
19.
20
.
21 .
Cornford, pc, 99-102.
Cornford, PC, 101-103.
Cf. Tim., 29A, 30A-B, 4oD, etc
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The kernel of Plato’s ethics is the doctrine that
man's reason is divine by reproducing in his own
nature the beauty and harmony revealed in the
cosmos
.
To be sure, Gornford is not admitting the Demiurge to be equal
with the Christian conception of G-od, but it seems quite obvious
[The writer considers this to be very signif leant] that, whether
he knows it or not, Cornford has been driven to interpret Plato
in terminology which is very close to that' of the Christian
Church.
Probably one of the most important distinctions neces-
sary in defining the platonic Concept of G-od is that which ex-
ists between the Demiurge and the Model or pattern )
in vi ew of which he operates, is not the latter an idea, a
final cause, i.e., the idea of the G-ood? in view of this the
Demiurge is not an Idea. ideas are usually specified by Plato
as objects of intelligences (not intelligences) while the
Demiurge of the Timaeus is obviously meant to be regarded as the
personification of the Nous, as Bury points out, however, while
this distinction which has just been made is on first blush
quite clarifying, it leads into still deeper water.- ' The
22. Cornford, PC, 34. Cf. Chapter III, p29.
23. Compare the terms of his statement with G-enesis I;
26-27. Note, too that the LXX along with Philo, Op. , . 16 uses
elvcwv
,
the .very same word Plato uses in translating 3IL .
: . .
.
) 9o^S3. TJ-jSQ-yv* TO1 niiwu
For an exposition of Philo's conc' :ept'r of creation, ' Cf. 'Courneen,
'
Art., (1914).
24. Bury, Tim.
,
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—problem is now that of the relation of Reason to 3oul. If the
Demiurge is constructed of the Soul, and Reason and Soul are
supposed to be separate, the relation is still unclear. Yet,
if, on the other hand, Soul is the first cause of motion, and
Reason possesses motion, Soul must be prior to Reason. Bury
suggests that Reason be regarded "as a species of Soul, a part
of 3oul,"^° and concludes that "the Demiurge is no separate
Power or independent Divinity, but merely a part or faculty of
the World -Soul, his apparent independence being due solely to
the mythical form of the exposition."
Both Bury and Cornford may be right here, yet does it
not seem that Taylor has adequately refuted both as has been
previously pointed out?~^ Admittedly, however, the writer is
willing to concede that Plato's argument limps here. Especially
is this so when by introducing several important concepts with-
out defining each separately, Plato has only clouded the issue.
Plato intended the Timaeus as a serious attempt at a
cosmology in spite of the fact that at times, poet that he was,
he has produced more of a cosmogony than a cosmology. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that he was striving for a satisfactory prin-
ciple for his explanation of the universe. From the evidence
presented, it is obvious that he found this principle in the
25. Cf. Cornford, PC, 39.
26. As in Rep
. ,
435Eff. Cf. also Tim
. ,
37B-C.
27. Chapter IV, pp. 61-62.
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concept of teleology. When he strove for a satisfactory, inclu-
sive, mode of expressing this principle, he fumbled, but only
after a supreme effort. As Kant struggled with autonomy, heter-
onomy, and theonomy so Plato was puzzled as to which way to
turn. 2 ^ But, at any rate, while Plato’s inconsistency must be
admitted in spite of Cornford, a fair comparison of the text of
the dialogue with the commentary of Taylor will eventuate in
favor of professor Taylor's view as more nearly approaching
Plato's concept of G-od. Archer-Hind's confusion of the inclu-
siveness of the World -Soul with a pantheistic, or more accurately
2Q
a panpsychistic view of the universe, is quite understandable. ^
Plato's concept of God is so distinct and outstanding that it
3eems quite clear that he must have meant it to be more than a
mere mythological sop to some of the religionists of his day.-^0
Therefore, the writer concludes that one is quite Justified in
referring to the Demiurge as God, a concept which, whether
Cornford (or Demos, or Helsell ) agrees to it or not, is in many
28. Witness the confusion that was in Kant's mind when
he penned Opus Postumum .
29. Archer-Hind, TP, 44-46, 116.
30. The writer insists that in the main Plato's concept
of God is fairly understandable—this in spite of Demos' remark
with respect to the "very considerable vagueness of the discus-
sion of the dialogue," and Dr. Paul R. Helsel's obstuse, not to
mention sarcastic remarks to the contrary. Cf. Demos, pp, 99,
and Helsel, Art. (1941), 194. in support of the contention that
Plato had done extensive thinking upon the subject, cf. his
Euthyphro
,
the first critical philosophy of religion, (ca. 400
B. C. )
,
and Laws
, 893B-899, the first theistic argument in his-
tory, (ca. 350 B.C. )
.
«\ i K ’O' . . ..
•
'
<
•
’
,
'
.
:
,
1 J. o
,
’
,
*
.
•
•
•••
•
.
•
•
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
'
.
I f 1
.
.
— i :
•
resoects almost svnonymous with the God of the Judaeo-Christian
tradition. While He does not create ex nihllo
,
He does act as
the embodiment of the rational principle of the universe, giving
order to what otherwise would be chaos. As in the parable of
Jeremiah, He is the Potter moulding the clay, or, to use Plato’s
own phase, He is o
,
the wax-moulder.^ In one out-
standing respect does He differ from the G-od of Christian
Theism: He i3 finite because faced with the eternal irrational
principle against which he must constantly strive. And even
this aspect of God's nature may be found implicit in the bib-
lical figure of the suffering God.
persuasion : the mediating factor between reason and nec -
essity
.
As previously pointed out, the problem which Plato is
considering in the Timaeus is that of the process whereby the
World, or more specifically, the World -Soul, was built up into
an harmonious structure. In other terminology, it is the prob-
lem of the evolution of the kosmos out of a pre-existing
chaotic state. As to what was the nature of Plato's hypothet-
ical solution of the problem, it is the purpose of the present
section to examine and to criticize.
Plato's approach is basically an attempt to offer a tel-
eological explanation of the universe in contrast to the mech-
anistic explanation of the atomistically minded pluralists of
his day. To state that Plato's approach is teleological, how-
31. Cf. Jer
. ,
18:1-6 and Tim., 7^G.
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ever, is only to scratch the surface, for the nexus of the prob-
lem which Plato is considering is the relationship between vovks
and
.
Moreover, Plato is very discerning in the distinc-
tion which he draws between cause proper, i.e., final cause, and
auxiliary cause, which he regards as the sum of necessary phys-
ical conditions. Not only vaguely suggestive of but vitally re-
lated to this distinction is the parallel distinction between
the operation of vows or the intelligent factor and
representing the world of necessity. The divine vovvs
,
which in
all things designs the best, is not always able completely to
realize these designs because of an intrinsic, incorrigible ele-
ment everlastingly not only subsistent in the World but present
prior to its being made. Always concerned with the niceties of
rhetorical expression, Plato presents this relationship, a basic
problem of his metaphysics, in the garb of a cosmogonous cosmol-
ogy.
At this point, before proceeding to the actual analysis
of this problem in terms of vo\rs
, ,
and 'rret.&w, it may be
worthwhile to make reference to Whitehead's critical considera-
tion of Law. Faced with the task of an analysis of law,
Whitehead observes that the intellectual world has usually divi-
ded itself into four groups or schools, viz., the school of
Immanence, the school of Imposition, the Positivist school of
Observation (i.e., mere description), and the school of Conven-
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tional interpretation.'52
Plato in the Timaeus affords an early instance of
wavering between the two doctrines of lav/, immanence
and imposition. .. .Plato ' 3 cosmology includes an ulti-
mate creator, shadowy and undefined, imposing his
design upon the universe. Secondly, the action and
reaction of the internal constituents is—for Plato—
the self-sufficient explanation of the flux of the
world: —’’Nothing was given off from it, nothing
entered it, —there was nothing but itself.”
Striking is the fact that Whitehead comes to the conclusion that
since apart from some notion of imposed Law, the doctrine of
Immanence provides absolutely no reason why the universe should
not be continually tobogganing into a lawless chaos.
The Universe, as understood in accordance with the
doctrine of Immanence, should exhibit itself as in-
cluding a stable actuality whose mutual implication
with the remainder of things secures an inevitable
trend towards order.
Thus he finds that "the Platonic 'persuasion' is required"^
With this preliminary statement, indicative of the role and sig-
A r\
nificance of TT6l&uj as the mediating factor between vov<s and
divoiyKn
,
an actual examination of these three vital factors is
in order.
32. Whitehead, AI, 154-. Observe Whitehead’s combina-
tion of immanent and transcendent factors in his concept of God.
"The notion of God... is that of an actual entity immanent in the
actual world, but transcending any finite cosmic epoch—a being
at once actual, eternal, immanent, and transcendent. The trans-
cendence of God is not peculiar to him. Every actual entity, in
virtue of its novelty, transcends its universe, God included."
PR, 143.
33. Whitehead, AI, 146-147, Cf. Bury, Tim
. ,
68d, E
where the "self-sufficient" explanation is described as a God
who "is sufficiently wise and powerful to blend the many into
one and to dissolve again the one into many" in contrast to mor-
tal man. In D, the Artificer is described as engendering the
self-sufficing or autarkical (tov/ oIvt^vstv ) and most perfect God.
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Klo-v-s may be described as that element in the universe
which is and expresses itself as Intelligence. It is the prin-
ciple of order ( Kocr-p-os ) as contrasted by the principle of chaos,
or to use Plato's terminology, "wandering cause" ).
In the second place, this element is an eternal Given of the
universe. Thus vcn^s Is in the role of World-Artificer (<Tr^iov^yo^
it being similar to the vo-v^s of Anaxgoras. The Demiurge, more-
over, is described by Plato as desiring (j(?ov\hfiecvs ) that "all
should be so far as possible, like unto Himself. in this
spirit, He imparts order to the world, acting without jealousy,
naturally preferring perfection to imperfection, and likewise
order to chaos. As has been previously noted Plato's choice of
a verb here is very significant. is used rather than
The former implies a deliberate, probably reflective
exercise of volition, while the latter implies no deliberation
or set purpose. Not a creator in the sense of creating ex
nihilo, the Demiurge only imposes order and system on a pre-
existing chaos.
Of important local color is the obvious fact that the
Platonic mrti.Quj
,
especially as expressed by the Demiurge, is in
direct contrast to the mechanistic principle of the atomists.
Nov-s is the regulating, integrating and thus unifying principle
of the universe and as such is a significant stride by way of a
refutation of the philosophy of the atomists.
34-. Bury, Tim., 30A.
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That the Demiurge is not the only agency of vonXs is seen
by a close examination of those sections of the dialogue where
Plato uses the plurals, <3e-o\ and Tiie g0£ S or goddesses,
as the case may be, are the delegated agents of o in
effecting His divine purpose. While there is only the one God
who can be called everlasting, the introduction of these auxil-
iary agents would seem to indicate that Plato is picturing God
not only as dependent upon other persons to effect his purposes,
but that he shares this rationality with other kindred spirits.
Turning to Necessity (tfv<*yK r\ ), Plato confronts the
reader with an irrational element in the universe. This element
is an irrational Given
,
or as Taylor calls it, "brute fact."^°
It is the 'irXoiv'ou^'/n oic-rcV
,
the wandering, rambling, aimless,
irresponsible, erratic, or errant cause. Yet, the most strik-
3 /
ing representation of oivuykft
,
is to be found in the somewhat
synonymous term, "Receptacle" (isTroSo^n ) . ^ This "Receptacle"
35. Bury, Tim . , 39E-40C.
36. Taylor, CPT, 300ff.
37. Note that the evil factor in the universe as con-
ceived by Plutarch is at once remarkably similar to a.nd strik-
ingly different from the concept of irrational necessity or
Receptacle as pictured in Plato’s Timaeus . The basic difference
is that Plutarch has personalized the evil factor in Typhon who
is said to be the enemy of Isis. in Mor, 351E, he is described
as "Conceited.
.
.because of his ignorance and self-deception."
If ignorance is defined as a lack of knowledge of the rational
then ignorance is almost synonymous with the
of Plato.
38. Bury, Tim.
, 48E-49A.
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is a further attempt on Plato’s part to explain his standpoint
in contrast to that of the atomists. Very acute is Plato’s
distinction between the ’’wherefrom” which is the timeless pat-
39tern and the ’’wherein” which is the timeless ’’Receptacle.”
Contrasting the necessity of the ’’Receptacle” and the ration-
ality of the Votas
,
Demos finds the Receptacle to be that aspect
of brute fact in things and v/hich in rational action is charac-
terized by self-determination . 40 Necessity is ’’the givenness of
ideas their sensible immediacy. Fact is what we find and are
compelled to accept.” As the irrational factor in Nature, the
Receptacle, says Demos, ’’affirms its own indeterminateness
against the Demiurgos who impresses it with the forms and thus
perpetually defeats him by the method of passive resistance .” 41
From this the investigator may gather that Plato does not mean
the Receptacle to be regarded necessarily as evil but merely as
indeterminate, and, in this sense, antithetical to the Demiurge.
Mere indeterminacy, however passive it may be, nevertheless,
when taken cumulatively, can have active force and thus is ever-
lastingly in the act of defeating or at least retarding the
progress of the purposive will of the
.
This portrayal of
necessity as being only active in a cumulative sense is quite
tame compared with Plutarch’s description of Typhon who,
39. Bury, Tim . , 50C.
40. Demos, pp, 35.
41. pp, 36.
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"prompted by jealousy and hostility "wrought terrible deeds
and by bringing utter confusion upon all things, filled the
whole earth, and the ocean with ill." This bears a strong re-
semblance to the concept of a devil so common in naive religious
realism. Yet it is undoubtedly better to accept the more con-
servative passive irrational factor of Plato than to lose one-
self in the exaggerated active evil of the highly imaginative
4-2
Typhon presented by plutarch'.
The solution which Plato offers as the key to the rela-
tionship between the two antithetical elements is in sharp con-
trast not only with the hypotheses of the Greek pluralists but
also with the theory expressed in Semitic literature as repre-
sented in the hagiographa of the ancient Hebrews. J Tne Genesis
account of bringing order out of chaos (as has already been re-
marked in a different connection) is merely a descriptive state-
ment of fact. First there is chaos and then there is a state of
42. Plutarch, Mor
. ,
36lD.
43. Cf. Whitehead’s comments on the platonic and Hebrew
hypothesis of origins in PR, 146. "in the Timaeus the origin of
the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal dis-
order, chaotic according to our ideals. This is the evolution-
ary doctrine of the philosophy of organism. Plato's notion has
puzzled critics who are obsessed with the Semitic theory of a
wholly transcendent God creating out of nothing an accidental
universe. Newton held the Semitic theory.... On all sides,
Plato's allegory of the evolution of a new type of order based
on new types of dominant societies became a daydream, puzzling
to commentators."
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order which the Elohim survey(s) and find^s ) to he good. (A &£
yn ftv kZL k£-\^<* crros.
. .
v<*A £l££V o <$)co^
,
ot <*. v<3qv;
.
* 3 TPi)^
t ZL i ~v_0 )• While the Hebrew account describes
• • •
..
things on the basis of a divine fiat, Plato actually provides an
hypothesis which is a genuine attempt to explain the nature of
45
the process as process . The key to this process, he finds in
the word persuasion. But what is the meaning behind this word,
and the other words connected with it? Reason, Plato says, con-
trols necessity by persuading her to conduct to the best end the
O J 3 /
most part of the things coming into existence. It is «sl olv^yKh-S
c / c \ r> -> /
rYTTu^e^hs 'V'TTo TVC'-lyoi^s that this universe is constructed.
Intelligent persuasion here is thoughtful, prudent, sensible,
)/
’understanding (Cft-p’C 0 v/o 's ) persuasion. Reason, moreover, is
said to control $tX©/tvs 9 i.e., rule) and to cause to yieUd
C ^
(XttT^o ju.G^v'la-s
,
i.e., to make inferior, "to be inferiored. ’’
)
O _ / )/ c /
The use of these verbs C v‘v£-m-vnrcuyc«w'o s J «^(oya»rro9 and YvrTtufc€V'h,s
44. Kittel, Bib
. Heb.
,
and Rahlfs, VTG-, Gen . 1:1-10.
Cf. also the concept of Ti^nat
,
the monster in Babylonian myth-
ology which strove against Marduk, the Sun God, as discussed by
Brightman in Art. (1939), 19-21.
45. Cf. Whitehead again. ’’Both for Plato and for
Aristotle the process of the actual world has been conceived as
a real incoming of forms into real potentiality, issuing into
that real togetherness which is an actual thing. Also, for the
Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a type of
order establishing a cosmic epoch. it is not the beginning of
matter of facts but the incoming of a certain type of social
order." PR, 147.
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would seem to indicate that necessity, at least, has been subor-
dinated if not actually subjugated or conquered by reason. Yet
conclusions must not be drawn prematurely. An argument based
merely upon words extracted from their context can be and is in
this case, the writer believes, somewhat misleading.
How does Plato really intend that 'TT'6 l<9c^ should be un-
derstood? To say that persuasion implies complete control, even
annihilation of necessity by reason is not Plato at all. It
savors of the catastrophic element so common in the apocalyptic
literature (particularly the apocraphal writings) of Christian
scripture and theology. ^ On the basis of Plato’s context, no
such complete subjugation of necessity is even implied to say
nothing of actually being suggested.
^
What, then, is the meaning of platonic persuasion? is
not the answer to this question suggested by the durative
46. Such annihilation is a favorite theme in Plutarch’s
De I 3 et Osiride . In Mor.
,
3703, Plutarch speaks as though
The evil principle personified by Typhon is to be completely
annihilated. While this concept is directly contrary to Plato's
concept of persuasion which is an unendliche Aufgabe
,
it bears a
striking resemblance to two N.T. passages. In Rev . , 20:10, the
beast, after being released for a period, is finally conquered
and cast into the lake of fire and brimstone for everlasting
torment. Yet, even this is not the everlasting annihilation
[but complete control] spoken of by Plutarch. in 1 Cor . , 15:
25-28, the resemblance is stronger, for there Paul states that
death shall be done away with.
47. in this connection it is interesting to observe
Brand Blanshard's identification (in the field of logic) of
system' with logical necessity. The irrational, he holds, must
be completely persuaded. NT, 335-355.
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Aktionsart of the verb ireL&ecV
,
and does not this suggest the
eternal nature of necessity as an everlasting problem, an
unendliche Aufgabe
,
confronting the Demiurge who must always be
persuading Necessity rationally to conform to its will? In this
connection, Demos observes that since the Receptacle can be
persuaded, it must have a degree of intelligence whereby it can
Ji Q
be persuaded, understand, and obey reason. Yet this seems un-
necessary as well as far-fetched. Is not accessibility to in-
telligence alone needed? Sense must not necessarily be reason
simply because reason can master it. That there are forces (not
only visible, as Plato specifically noted, but invisible as
well) eternally, i.e., now and always at work in Nature, that
are not completely subdued in the sense of annihilation or com-
plete domination, I think we must by this time admit. What
Plato is trying to say is that in the world as a system, nothing
ever really happens except by choice of a rational will although
the actual content of this process is to a large extent in the
i /
nature of 4-vuyi<n
.
indeed, as Cornford observes, and as Taylor
admits by his extended treatment of the problem, it is rather
difficult to believe that Plato would have devoted one third of
his cosmology to the products of necessity as opposed to the
works of reason, if he had meant nothing more than that naught
48. Demos, pp, 43. Cf. Whitehead, AI, 240. Reason, he
says, is a personal unity. Possibly this is a source for Demos'
view. Plutarch's personalization of evil as Typhon may also
have influenced Demos in the development of his view.
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comes about of necessity except under reason’s complete con-
trol.^
What now is the resultant situation between yovts and
<iyyyKn ? on the basis of this introductory survey of the na-
ture and operation of intelligent persuasion upon necessity, it
is now a propos to the problem to ask as to the resultant situa-
tion between and kvdyKn . To begin with, it is obvious
that Plato has interwoven myth and scientific cosmology through-
out the entire section from 69B-92C. Be that as it may, however,
this need not obscure the fact that both metaphysically and
ethically, this relationship between Vov-s and dv*yt<r) which has
been discussed on the basis ofTTei0u> as a mediating factor is
one of necessary interaction. From a metaphysical standpoint it
is possible to say that this interrelationship brings about the
universe as a whole. On the human level, the same process,
—
that of controlling necessity by intelligence or rationality
—
must operate in any ethical situation. Viewed in this light,
the writer likes to regard the Timaeus as the original preface
to Morals
.
A second observation which should be made concerns the
question of monism, dualism, and pluralism. It has been ob-
served, and the writer believes correctly, that Plato has inten-
tionally attempted to escape the pluralism of the atomi3ts. To
49. Comford, PC, 273.
50. Cf. Lippmann, PM. This fascinating aspect of the
Timaeus will be discussed presently.

78
a certain degree, Plato has avoided such an atomistic pluralism
and he is to he commended for it. in this way, the great poet-
philosopher has achieved a definite unity and thus has presented
the people of his day with a view of the universe which cuts
sharply across pluralistic atomism. A disorganized universe of
scattered atoms falls into place in the whole. One must not be
too enthusiastic over this, however, for if Plato is read with
discrimination it will be discovered that he has only succeeded
in presenting his student with a dualism. As Demos has cor-
rectly noted, the whole bent of the platonic argument is anti-
monistic. ’’Plato’s mind is sensitive to the complexity of the
cosmos as disclosing a plurality of phases.
5
1 if one is to ex-
plain or attempt to explain this relationship between reason and
necessity on a. basis of teleology (and this would seem to be
Plato's aim), it will be necessary to regard the concept of
purpose (as effected by reason) as descriptive of a God or out-
standing Purpose which works in a universe including Him, but
only as a part of the whole, a part which no matter how impor-
tant and powerful is to some degree limited or restricted by
other factors within that whole. With reference to Plato’s God,
these elements are external, and thus Plato's God becomes a part
of a larger whole. 52 professor Brightman’s theory which re-
51. Demos, PP, 123.
52. It might be noted that Demos finds little that is
objectionable in this dualism, never considering it worthy of
serious adverse criticism.
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T
verses the situation by including these elements in his idea of
God (v/hile not without its difficulties) seems to the writer to
be a definite advance upon this aspect of Plato’s work in that
he has achieved the much sought after monism. ^3
The metaphysics of the Timaeus as a basis for Plato ’
s
theoretical and applied ethiC3
. The immediately preceeding
study, it is hoped, has provided a Weltanschauung that is essen-
tially Platonic in its recognition of the two antithetical
A 3 /
factors, Vows and div^yi<h, which eternally must interact on the
basis of rational persuasion. That the familiar Platonic dualism
as well as the Democritean atomistic pluralism might be avoided.
Professor Brightman's modification which places both rational
and irrational factors within the nature of God has been admit-
ted as both a cogent and possible hypothesis which may be help-
ful in untying the knotty metaphysical problem which Plato has so
beautifully set forth, yet, to be sure, has hardly solved. The
suggestion has been made that the Timaeus may well be looked
54
upon as Plato’s introduction to ethics or ’’preface to morals.
Not alone in this conviction the writer would refer to
Whitehead's pointed remark that
there is [a] side to the Timaeus which finds no
analogy in the Scholium [of Newton]
. in general
terms, this side of the Timaeus may be termed its
metaphysical character, that is to say, its endeavor
to connect the behaviour of things with the formal
53. Brightman, pG, 174-177, PR, 336-340.
54. Of. p. 77.
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nature of things. The behaviour apart from the
things is abstract, and so are the things apart
from their behaviour. Newton—wisely, for his
purposes—made this abstraction which the Timaeus
endeavors to avoid. 55
If this is so, the dialogue as a basic metaphysical study or
Weltanschauung should provide certain Lehnsltze which conve-
niently may be carried over into a realistic Leben sanschauung
which would be sufficiently frank to face both the facts of the
universe as a whole and the facts of human experience. With
this problem in mind—an aspect of the Timaeus which both Taylor
and Cornford almost completely neglect
— ,
it may be well to
resurvey the entire argument of the dialogue.
The keynote or theme of the entire problem of which the
Timaeus treats is to be found in the famous passage in 28a.
\ >\ > \
Here, besides making the important distinction between to oV deu
and To ...Ate, Plato also demonstrates, in principle
his fundamental "given” of reason and unreason. That which is
\ \ >/
uniformly (identically, ttuvtu oV ) existent, is apprehen-
sible by thought with the aid of reason. This is the noumenal
aspect of reality. That which is an object of opinion with the
aid of unreasoning sensation is that which becomes and perishes,
never really being existent. This is the phenomenal order of
reality. This latter ”non-rational given” produces that which
"becomes and perishes” ( yiy vo^ervov <^oW-v*h-€Vov' ) comparable
to what Whitehead and Locke describe in terms of "perishing
55. Whitehead, pr, 144.
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occasions." Thus, at the very beginning of Plato’s cosmology,
there is an implicit distinction drawn between a rational and
non -rational element in the universe although it should be ob-
served that in contrast to later usage , here refers to
purely logical necessity.
Besides laying down the two parallel principles, basic
in his metaphysics, Plato almost immediately introduces the
Demiurge. it is of particular significance that Plato so early
in the dialogue as this should picture the Demiurge in his rela-
tions to these two basic principles of reality. While the
Demiurge is described as desiring that all things should be good
and nothing evil, there is an important qualifying phase, ”so
far as possible” (K^ra Furthermore, the Demiurge,
/
seeing that all things are not in a state of rest but KLVovycevw
TrX\^ycy*.E.\u*s cCr^YvrcU'S
,
brings order out of disorder ( £.is
v nyctyav £*. -rns
.
This
is the first specific statement by Plato of an attempt to con-
trol the irrational given.
It is not long before Plato offers a thorough discussion
of a rational and irrational given .
^
Three factors are here
considered. First, there is Being which is indivisible and
always the same. Secondly, there is Being which is transient
and divisible into bodies. With these, Timaeus states that God
56. Eury, Tim
. ,
69Aff.
57. Bury, Tim., 35A,B.
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blended a third form of Being, this being compounded out of the
two, the Same and the Other. ( T^c'Tov' &§> tv puecnu
o-v*cro<K-S £lSo-s
}
tu.s Tig t^^to-C/* cp t*<£. uj-s ...
hyX ~Tv\s (B^rt-eo-v*.
)
As Plato’s argument progresses, necessity becomes a
factor of ever increasing importance. Yet, as was hinted earli-
er, there is more than one kind of necessity. To begin with
there is logical or rational necessity. 58 Eventually, however,
SQPlato is ready to face the problem of irrational necessity.
The terminology which Plato adopts here is of such sufficient
/difference that it is worthy of note. The Artificer
is spoken of as taking over certain things and using their in-
J / r /
herent properties as subservient causes (oUtl^c-s isrm^c'row'd.LS ).
Yet, on the other hand, He Himself designed the Good in all that
was being generated. Wherefore (<£V« Sn) f says Timaeus, one
should make a careful distinction between two kinds of causes
), the necessary ("To y
on one hand (Here, empirical necessity, non-rational) and the
divine (to QelaV )
,
i.e., logical necessity.
The significant point has not as yet been made however.
Not only is it necessary to make the aforementioned distinctions
but one should
Seta/ <£V%TTeL J>h~r'eZ krhV<? ujsTo
\
Y~(L\/
58. Bury, Tim
. ,
28a, 37C.
59. Eury, Tim., 68E, 69A.
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This is Plato’s text for the next section of the argument. The
statement implies that Plato considers that mechanism is neces-
sary (as means to ends, data to norms) to teleology.
That Plato thought of the Demiurge as ruling over neces-
sity seems quite clear.^ Yet as has been shown, this does not
seem to be pure omnipotence. Rather is this an eternal problem
with the Demiurge who must continually persuade necessity. The
task of divine persuasion of necessity is thus an unendliche
Aufgabe
.
As Cornford has understandingly observed,
if we make [the] Demiurge omnipotent and at the same
time attribute to him the modern conception of natural
lav; we shall involve him in the nineteenth century
conflict of religion and science.
Cornford is undoubtedly right. Plato, in many respects
the first great rationalist, was too farsighted to postulate the
providence of an all-powerful God which defies complete rational
explanation when confronted with a thoroughly determined chain
of causes and effects which have no room for His intervention.
But what—the question still remains unanswered—is the
nature of platonic persuasion? To be sure, logical necessity,
rationality, is said to persuade the irrational element in the
60. Bury, Tim
. ,
48a.
61. Cornford, PC, 37.
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universe and thus bring about certain salutary results. Since
it is a process which goes on eternally (This is, of course,
basically indicated by the durative Aktionsart of the Greek
verb.), persuasion cannot be understood as annihilation or com-
plete domination. Nothing happens in the world as a system ex-
cept by the choice of a rational will (exercised by the Demi-
urge). Yet, it is of supreme importance that one realize that
the content of these happenings is, to a large extent, of neces-
sity. How, then, is one to conceive of the control of the non-
rational given? Apparently, there is a very definite active as
well as a passive element in the irrational given. In view of
this, the writer, personally, prefers to think of the platonic
persuasion in terms of rational direction
. It is the rational
element, exercised by the will of the Demiurge, which gives
direction to the universe. This, when compared with the Timaeus
,
is quite in accord with the main teleological thrust of Plato's
argument. The principle here enunciated—rational direction
—
may be illustrated by the familiar adage that "you can lead a
horse to water but you can't make him drink." Or to use an even
more homely example from an even lower level of intelligence, a
herd of cows may be led down a country road to a certain pasture,
yet the actual urge for locomotion (unless there is such an ex-
pression of stubborn waywardness that it becomes necessary as
well as practical to employ a sharp goad) must originate in their*
own wills, to resort to a third illustration, consider the prob-
lem which faced some of the larger dinosauria, the forty -foot
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long megalosaurus
,
or the twenty-five foot iquanodon
,
or even
the medium-sized diplodocus . in each of these species there
were very small heads—this fact, of course, indicative of the
animal's slight brain development and consequent low order of
intelligence. What a problem megalosaurus must have had with
his small brain and slow reflexes when he wished to move the tip
of his tail! Obviously, such an animal is a capital illustration
of the immense bulk of slow -to -respond irrationality which chal-
lenges the Demiurge to impart to it order and rationality, to
give rational direction, if you please, to its lumbering loco-
motion. The horse which refuses to drink is an excellent ex-
ample of the partial (at least) frustration of the rational
purpose of the Demiurge. The cows on the other hand, especially
when wandering aimlessly, are living incarnations of errant
cause. The dinosaur, finally, with its immensity and slow re-
flexes is an example of the obtuseness of irrationality in re-
sponding to the stimulus of rational persuasion. In all three
illustrations the extent of the positive expression of the
divine purpose is a limited rational direction , personally,
the writer is of the opinion that Plato's argument would have
been much clearer if he had expanded his concept of persuasion
in terms of this directive principle, although one must admit
that while it is not at all explicit, this principle is very
definitely implied in the argument.
By way of a parenthesis, the writer observes that
Plato's postulation of two basic elements, neither of which is
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sufficient unto itself, has significant metaphysical implica-
tions. Rationality has no concrete meaning (aside from a purely
formal significance) except as it can be defined in terms which
distinguish it from an irrational element. Furthermore, from an
ethical standpoint, it is significant to note that rationality
never forces, i.e., actually compels irrationality to respond in
certain desired patterns. Rationality always employs rational
means which persuasively influence non-rationality. Rationality
would be defeating its own purposes if it resorted to violent
force instead of rational persuasion in directing the potential
yet usually wasted energies of errant cause. Plato here implic-
itly recognizes that there is no moral or ethical choice without
freedom of the will. He is so convinced of this that he even
sees the rational given respecting the "hypothetical" will of an
irrational necessity, errant cause.
The fundamental principles which have just been set forth
have very significant ethical implications relative to the dis-
cussion of freedom of the will which is found in later sections
of the dialogue. - in this later context, the subject of the
conversation is abnormal psychology. The nature of disease is
spoken of as essentially a mechanism. Yet, there is no physio-
logical determinism on the rational life as Taylor seems to
think. Physiological determinism is only admitted on a natural
62. Bury, Tim., 86A-87B.
63. Taylor, CPT, 610-616.
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minimum, i.e., on a purely physiological or biological level.
The irrational life, on the other hand, will experience disease
and this as mechanistic, just as, given A as cause, B is certain
to be the effect. This is not at all inconsistent with a theory
of freedom. An observation by professor Whitehead may be
informative at this point.
The Timaeus connects behaviour with the ultimate
molecular characteristics of the actual entities.
Plato conceives the notion of definite societies
of actual molecular entities, each society with
its defining characteristics. He does not conceive
this assemblage of societies as causa sui . But he
does conceive it a3 the work of subordinate deities,
who are the animating principles of those departments
of nature. in G-reek thought, either poetic or
philosophic, the separation between the and
such deities had not that absolute character which
it has for us who have inherited the Semitic
Jehovah. 86
Later on, as if to make sure that he has been correctly under-
stood, Plato gives back much of the freedom that he at first
seems to take away. Thus he concludes this section, his "pref-
ace to morals," with a plea for rational control of one’s life,
attempting, if possible, a healthy balancing of the irrational
by the rational.
Plato concludes the dialogue with a rather thorough
64. Cf. this with Professor Werkmeister ’ s philosophy of
levels, particularly with reference to his chapter on freedom
in PS.
65. Cf. previous quotation, p.79ff.
66. Whitehead, PR, 144.
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discussion of the evolutionary hypothesis. 0
"'
7
’’Thus, both then
and now, living creatures keep passing into one another in all
these ways, as they undergo transformation by the loss or by the
gain of reason and unreason. The processes of evolution in-
volve a very definite control of the ’’given,” the reason and
unreason of reality. Such a control, a persuasion, or a rational
direction of the irrational by the rational is never accom-
plished without a struggle. This struggle, moreover, involves
not only certain gains but as Plato has observed, it involves
certain losses, such gains or losses calculated in terms of
degrees of reason or unreason. (voO Avoids KoU- Krwrei
It is high time that the loose ends of this argument be
now drawn together. What specific connection existed between
Plato's concept of God and his representation of the struggle
between reason and necessity? As a corollary to this, what are
the moral implications of Plato's metaphysics?
The problem of a conflict between reason and necessity,
Demos finds, arises out of the very nature of God. This asser-
tion is not surprising. On the basis of preliminary investiga-
tions the writer has been firm in his insistence that the crea-
tivity of Plato’s God is not ex nihilo
. Rather it is like
67. Note Whitehead's observation in PR, 143. "The full
sweep of the modem doctrine of evolution would have confused
the Newton of the Scholium but would have enlightened the plato
of the Timaeus .
”
68. Bury, Tim., 92B, C.
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the productive activity of an artisan or a sculptor,
working over their materials. Thus the Platonic G-od
is viewed as creating the world by operating upon
something which He has not created, a timeless
receptacle. 0:5
This is a conception which is quite contrary to the first verse
of the (Genesis account of creation, yet strikingly similar to
the sentiment of the third and fourth verses of the account in
view of the second verse. 7^ Creation, Demos observes, is trans-
formation, a transformation which consists in the introduction
of order into chaos, "the directing of the powers and motions of
the receptacle so that they will work for the best."
It is by this time the assumption of the writer that
Plato's world was the product of two "causes," reason and neces-
sity or "errant cause." If one is to present a complete
geogony, references to these operations of the so-called "errant
cause" must be included. Demos has described reason and neces-
sity as active and passive, respectively. in the large, this is
probably a fairly accurate representation. Yet, is there not a
sense in which one can think of necessity with its great poten-
tialities by which it limits G-od, in a very true way, as active?
The passivity of the Receptacle is not simply a detached uncon-
cern for the purposes and workings of res.son. Rather is it a
passivity which, because of its bulk and restraining influence.
69. Demos, pp, 106.
70. This, of course, is on the assumption that the
meaning of >03. is certain. The LXX is of little help since it
uses the "innocent," platonic en-oCntrtv #
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is potentially if not actually active. Hence, there seems to be
good reason to object to Demos' blanket term "passive" for it
fails to explain the interaction which goes on in the eternal
conflict between reason and necessity. Even Demos implicitly
admits this when he observes the resistance of the Receptacle as
"frustrating" God.? 1
In consideration of this unendliche Aufgabe , then, the
following observations on God must be made. Plato's God (1) is
not omnipotent, (2) is not the author of evil, (3) is the author
of the good in the world, (4) is limited, even frustrated to a
certain extent, although never completely, (5) wages undying
72
warfare against all evil, (6) finds Himself confronted by evil
as a fact, a resisting power, and (7) attempts to make the best
of His limitations by an enduring resistance to this independent,
eternal factor, errant cause. Each of these observations, as
will presently be seen, has a very definite application to the
human sphere of moral action.
The unendliche Aufgabe would appear to be the great
basic question of Plato’s conception of the universe. It is
both a problem to man and a problem to God. God "is the divine
providence as well as the divine creator. .., the continuing cause
of creation."?? Try as one will, he can never get away from the
71. Demos, p?, 106.
72. Cf. Laws
, 906a, where this is said of "the gods."
73. Demos, pp, 607.
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fact that Plato sees the world as dependent on God. He is the
Creator of the world in the sense that, as ordered by God, it is
in timeless dependence on Him. He is cause, the world is the
effect. Says Demos, "the world is an everlasting revelation of
God. God is the principle necessary to account for the related-
ness of the ideal pattern to the receptacle. "75 jt was this
matter of revelation undoubtedly—it is obviously in Plato—that
Archer-Hind, deriving his immediate inspiration from the Neo-
Platonists, misconstrued and eventually allowed to sprout into
74
a full-grown pantheistic conception of the universe. ' to be
sure, the world, as cosmos, endures because God wills it thus. J
Yet this is not a pantheism. Plato's comparison of the gods to
commanders of armies, physicians, and farmers is a far cry from
such a notion.^ Rather is He the great agent who continuously
imparts cosmos to an otherwise potentially irrational universe.
Very much to the point is the chief characteristic of
God as He deals with the affairs of men and nations. As has
been previously seen, when reason is confronted by necessity,
reason persuades or continually attempts to persuade (and with
some degree of success) errant cause. Whitehead's observation
on persuasion as a principle of international relations is well
taken.
Archer -Hind, TP.
Bury, Tim
. ,
4lA.
Plato, Laws
,
906a.
74.
75.
76.
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The compulsory dominion of men over men has a double
significance. it has a benign effect so far as it
secures the co-ordination of behaviour necessary for
social welfare. But it is fatal to extend this do-
minion beyond the barest limits necessary for this
co-ordination. The progressive societies are those
which most decisively have trusted themselves to the
fourth factor which is the way of persuasion. Amidst
all the activities of mankind there are three which
chiefly have promoted this last factor in human life.
They are family affections aroused in sex relations
and in the nurture of children, intellectual curiosity
leading to enjoyment in the interchange of ideas and--
as soon as large-scale societies a.rose-- the practice
of commerce. 77
This same spirit is carried by G-od into other fields of endeavor
and is to be imitated by mankind. The perfect ruler is not to
govern by mere law, because laws are general "making no allow-
ances for individual variations. "78 gvery case must be judged
on its own merits. Thus, magistrates must rule by reason, not
merely by lav;. Just as creation (from the platonic point of
view) is "an operation by G-od upon the receptacle. .. .not an act
of brute force but persuasion," winning over the Receptacle to
the divine purpose, so man should attempt to exert his acts in
the spirit of persuasion.
The writer’s favorite contention that the Timaeus is
Plato’s preface to Morals is well supported, not only by the
fact that the Timaeus is the second member of (at least) a tril-
ogy,79 tut by several references in both the Republic and the
92
77. Whitehead, AI, 108, 109.
78. Demos, pp, 109.
79. The Gritias
,
of course, is intended as its sequel.
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Laws, in the former work, the wise legislator is described as a
person who does not impose lav/s by fiat but " introduces them
with a preamble explaining the reasons necessitating these
laws. "SO it is the wise teacher who relies on persuasion. in
the latter work, Plato introduces the wise physician who gives
no prescription until he has gained the patient’s consent. Only
then, "while securing the patient’s combined docility, by per-
suasion
,
does he complete the task of restoring him to health. "81
That Plato, throughout the course of his literary career
developed a rather thorough theodicy is made evident by a brief
survey of his works. Ardent questionings of men were not to go
unanswered and thus stimulate moral agnosticism and skepticism.
The solution of the problem of evil offered in the Timaeus is
the basic metaphysical analysis which he makes of the problem.
Here, evil is said to be due to the operation of errant cause.
Furthermore, as Demos has observed, evil may be considered as
unreal. "Things are unreal to the extent that they are evil."®2
Or again, the character of evil is only an appearance in things.
"All things are really good; the appearance of evil arises from
one’s failure to perceive the whole scheme of things."^ From
another of Plato’s dialogues, one can gather that evil is
•o00 Jowett
,
DP, He£.
,
548b.
•
1
—
1
CO Jowett, DP, Laws, 7200, D.
CMCO Demos
,
PP, 116.
83. Jowett, DP, Laws, 9030.
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:
accounted for by the absences of God from the world [whether
these absences are to be taken literally or not is a moot
Q h
question.], "whereby the world takes charge of its destiny."
The world is given over to innate desire and fate, "to the
bodily element, of which it partakes, to its primeval condition
of disorder." Thus, as is the case in the Timaeus
,
the
Politicus views evil as the innate tendency of the cosmos. As
for the Theaetetus
,
there it is found that evil is accounted for
as a necessary logical opposite to good. "Two patterns are set
up in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the god-
less, which is most wretched." 3 The Philebus gives the some-
what unusual suggestion that evil comes from an "independent
cause of separation, in addition to God, who is the cause of the
mixture. "^o This dualism is made explicit, Demos observes, in
the Laws where the hint is "elaborated into the doctrine of two
separate gods, the one the cause of the good, and the other, the
cause of evil in the world.
Actually, Plato has presented two, somewhat distinct
theodicies. First, evil is confusion and results from a neutral
course. Secondly, "evil is a form and actual evil results from
an evil cause." While both of these views are in a sense com-
84. Jowett, DP, Pol., 274a, 272S, 273B
85. Jowett, DP, The.
,
176E.
86. jowett, DP, Phi., 23D.
87. Demos, pp, 116.
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patible with the metaphysics of the Timaeus—"confusion,
"
"neutral cause" sound very much like "errant cause"—the latter
view which posits a surd evil seems to go below the surface of
mere "confusion." Furthermore, this latter view is closer to
the metaphysics of the Timaeus where the foreground is occupied
with a discussion of the two ultimates. Reason and Necessity.
Obviously, on the basis of these scattered references, in his
several writings, one must conclude that Plato's thought harbors
an internal contradiction. Plato never seems to have cleared it
up for he was still holding to it when he penned his last great
OO
work, the Laws. Whatever may be the internal difficulty, how-
ever, it is important to note that plato’s thinking on this
score grows out of a basic metaphysical conception of G-od and
the world. It is such a line of thought which is basic to the
Politicus
,
the phaedrus
,
the Gritias
,
and perhaps finds its most
complete expression in the Timaeus . These are outstanding
instances of Plato's belief in metaphysics as the crroc^&Zd for
any supplementary observations on government and morals.
Not only does reason aim both at public and private good
hut it is expressed ideally in moderation. The latter pages
of the Timaeus give wide place to this thesis. To be sure, most
of Plato's physiological and medical knowledge has long since
been superseded. Yet, the principles herein enunciated are of
88. jowett, DP, Laws , 896s, 897D.
89. Bury, Tim
. , 71A.
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very practical significance, ideally, man should seek a proper
symmetry between body and soul. Certainly, the writer would be
wary of stating categorically that disease comes as a result of
conflict between body and soul. And yet, there is a very sig-
nificant principle that is implicitly stated here, physical
debility can very often cause a pathological personality. Con-
versely, the absence of reasoned control of the body will open
the way to dissipation. Plato's plea is basically for the
reasoned, the rational life. There is much more to be said for
this principle than is usually conceded in many medical
, 90
circles.
90. Bury, Tim., 87E-88C; Demos, pp, 345-379.
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CHAFTER V
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
THE PERMANENT VALUE OF THE TIMAEUS AS A COSMOLOGY
The distinction between a cosmogony and a cosmology : its
relation to the problems raised by the Cornfordian and Taylorian
approach
. As stated earlier in this study, the basic purpose of
this study has been to ascertain whether or not the Timaeus
rightly may be considered a serious attempt on plato's part to
furnish the scientific -philosophical world with a genuine cos-
mology. Therefore, it may be well at this point to distinguish
between a cosmogony and a cosmology since a thorough understand-
ing of some of the criticism which has been directed toward the
Timaeus rests on a careful discrimination between these two
terms. Occasional references have been made to these two words,
and now as the end of this study approaches and an inventory of
findings together with an evaluation of these findings is made,
it becomes imperative that they be carefully defined before
being applied to the platonic dialogue under consideration.
Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Edition)
has the following two entries.
Cosmology: plus Xoyo^
.
That branch of meta-
physics which treats of tne character of the universe
as an orderly system or cosmos; also a treatise re-
lating to the structure and parts of the world system.
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Cosmogony: KoV|a_o.s plus y<.vg.<rfi«i u i # The creation,
origination, or manner of coming into being, of
the world or universe. 2. A theory or account
of the origination of the universe; also such
theories considered as a department of knowledge.
Thus, while there are metaphysical elements in both types of
works, the writer would suggest that the term "cosmogony" be
applied only to uncritical observations such as those found in
the G-enesis hymn of creation, and the term "cosmology" to a more
critical and intentionally metaphysical treatment such as the
Timaeus
.
That Plato has combined both the scientific and the
poetic elements in his study does not need demonstration. The
writer agrees with Professor Whitehead when he says that
To the modern reader, the Timaeus
,
considered as
a statement of scientific details, is in compari-
son with the Scholium [of Newton] simply foolish.
But what it lacks in superficial detail, it makes
up for by its philosophical depth. If it be read
as an allegory, it conveys profound truth; whereas
the Scholium is an immensely able statement of
details which, although abstract and inadequate
as a philosophy, can within certain limits be tho-
roughly trusted for the deduction of truths at the
same level of abstraction as itself. 2
Yet from the mass of evidence to v/hich reference has been me.de
here and there throughout the pages of this study, the writer
feels free to regard the Timaeus as a cosmogonous cosmology.
That is, Plato is primarily concerned with the presentation of a
scientific -philosophical interpretation of the cosmos; always
1. Cf. Burns, Art. (1914).
2. Whitehead, PR, 142.
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the poet, however, Plato is unable to resist the temptation to
color his study with the metaphors of poetry.-'
As a cosmology, the Timaeus presents some of the basic
—
problems of reality, problems which will eternally demand the
careful consideration of mortal man. To these problems, in
veritable cosmological fashion, Plato has ventured to provide
an answer. In these two accomplishments lies the permanent
value of Plato's Timaeus
.
Not satisfied with a limitation of this study to the
text of the Timaeus
,
the commentaries of two of the greatest
English students of Plato were chosen as basic reference works.
As was to be expected, each of these scholars had his own par-
ticular approach and interpretation of the dialogue. Taylor at
times has been so concerned with the minutiae of G-reek grammar
and historical correlations--both important to be sure—that he
has produced a book which is atomistic in its survey of the
Timaeus
. At one moment the student is impressed by the thor-
oughness and carefulness of Taylor's scholarship, at the next,
he is disappointed to find Taylor riding his hobbies, the
"Taylorian heresy" (as Cornford calls it), explicit correlations
with Pythagoreanisra, Aris totelianism, and the philosophy of
Whitehead, and implicit correlations with traditional Christian
theism, professor Cornford, on the other hand, is often hyper-
critical of Taylor's work yet succeeds in presenting a more
3. Cf. Edman, Art. (1936).
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synoptic and therefore more readable commentary on the dialogue.
While Dr. Taylor's concept of God is probably closer to Piato's,
Gornford is more ca,reful to observe the limitations which neces-
sity places upon Plato's God. Dissatisfied with both concepts
of God which Taylor and Cornford had presented, the writer has
taken it upon himself to offer a critique and synthesis of these
two views.
^
Probably the most unsatisfactory feature in both commen-
taries of Taylor and Cornford is an almost total neglect of a
problem which, in the mind of the writer (as in the mind of
Plato), constitutes the main thrust of the Timaeus . This problem
has been discussed somewhat extendedly, under the heading
"persuasion: the mediating factor between necessity and persua-
sion." To be sure, Gornford, at the very close of his work has
made a very suggestive comparison of this basic problem with the
conflict of Zeus and Destiny as depicted in the Qresteia of
fteschylus .5 if Cornford was 30 impressed by this parallel, if
he believes as, he says, that this is
the way to peace, for Plato as for Aeschylus, his
thorough reconcilement of the rational and the ir-
rational, of Zeus and Fate, of Reason and Necessity,
not by force but by persuasion,
why has he not seen fit to present a worthy analysis of this key
problem of Plato's argument? It is the contention of the writer
4. Cf. Chapter IV, p. 55ff.
5. Cornford, pc, 361-364; Oates, CGD, v. I, l63ff.
Cf. particularly the close of the Eumenides.
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that no piece of 3cholarly investigation is complete until it
has made both an analysis and a synoptic synthesis of the prob-
lem. It has been with this goal in mind that the writer has
made this study, in part at least, a synthesis of the two inter-
pretations of Professors Taylor and Cornford. In addition to
this, the writer has found it practicable to offer a suggestive
thesis that the Timaeus constitutes the metaphysical basis for
Plato's theoretical and applied ethics. This is another pos-
sible problem which Taylor and Cornford might well have treated.
In summary, the writer finds (1) that the "Taylorian
heresy" (together with its corollaries) is interesting yet both
unnecessary as well as lacking in conclusive evidence; (2) that
Taylor's view of God, while nearer to the God of Plato than the
emasculated god of Cornford, is unnecessarily Christianized; (3)
that Cornford 's treatment of Reason and Necessity is commendably
frank in its willingness to face the two undeniable "givens" of
metaphysical reality; (4) and that both Taylor and Cornford are
deficient in providing adequate studies of both persuasion--the
mediating factor between necessity and persuasion [interpreted
by the rational as a principle of rational direction ] --and the
ethical implications of the Timaeus as a "preface to morals."
The Timaeus through the centuries
. That the Timaeus has
exerted a profound influence through the centuries is amply dem-
onstrated by numerous works which owe their inspiration to this
profound dialogue of Plato. The early years of the Christian
era witnessed the production of Plutarch's Moralia, several
'o
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essays of which owe much to the Timaeus
,
and Philo’s De Qpificio
Mundi, as well as numerous minor works of the Neo-Platonic
school. During the middle ages, the Timaeus exerted a tremen-
dous (if not always a too critical) influence upon such men as
Thierry de Chartres and Bernard Sylvester de Tours, probably
the best summary of this influence is given by Dr. Etienne
G-ilson in La philosophie au moyen age .
Dans son De sex dierum operibus
,
fortement influence
par le Timbe, Thierry sTe^force d'etablir 1' accord
entre la philosophie de Platon et le rbcit de la
Genbse. H enseigne la creation de la matibre en
assimilant le pbre b la cause efficiente, le Fils b
la cause formelle, le Saint-Esprit b la cause finale
et les quatre blbments b la cause materielle.
• • • •
Bernard Sylvestre, oh de Tours, a rbdigb son De ~mundi
universitate sive Megaco3mus et Microcosmus sous cette
meme influence de Timbe que nous retrouvons partout
prbsente dans les milieux chartrains. Dans le premier
livre la Nature se plaint et se lamente orbs de la
providence divine de la confusion oh se trouve la
matibre premibre et la prie d'ordonner le monde avec
plus de beautb. La Providence y consent volontiers et,
pour accbder b ces pribres, distingue au sein de la
matibre les quatre blbments. Tel est l'objet du
Mbgacosme
.
Dans le second livre, ou Microscosme
,
la
Providence s'adresse b la Nature, cblbbre l’ordre
au’elle vient d'introduire dans le monde, promet de
former l’homme corame couronnement de tout son ouvrage,
l’homme est alors formb avec les restes des quatre
blbments.
?
More recent days have seen the publication of Paul Elmer More's
Hellenistic philosophies
,
Demos 1 philosophy of Plato
,
and par-
ticularly Whitehead' s principles of Natural Knowledge
,
process
and Reality
,
and Adventures of ideas as well as the more
specialized commentaries of G-omperz, Robin, Taylor and Cornford.
7. Gilson, PMA, 61-63.
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Thoroughly impressed with the influence and the importance of
the Timaeus
,
Alfred North Whitehead writes as follows.
The history of philosophy discloses two cosmol-
ogies which at different periods have dominated
European thought, Plato's Timaeus
,
and the cosmol-
ogy of the seventeenth century, whose chief authors
were Galileo, Decartes, Newton, Locke. In attempt-
ing an enterprise of the same kind, it is wise to
follow the clue that perhaps the true solution con-
sists in a fusion of the two previous schemes, with
modifications demanded by self-consistency and the
advance of knowledge. 0
Thus it is that this great Anglo-American philosopher-mathemati-
cian has presented his own cosmology in a, set of lectures that
have "been framed in accordance with this reliance on the posi-
tive value of the philosophical tradition." Whitehead's conten-
tion that the roots of all significant modern philosophy stem
from Plato receives strong support when it is realized that the
Timaeus alone has set a plurality of the basic problems of con-
temporary philosophic thought.
9
A personal evaluation of the Timaeus. It is the enthu-
siastic conviction of the writer that the Timaeus is a fair rep-
resentation of Plato's system of metaphysics. While this dia
logue is possibly not on a par with the Apology or the Crlto
from a literary standpoint, and while it may lack some of the
more dramatic potentialities of certain other dialogues of
8. Whitehead, PR, ix.
9. Whitehead, PR, 63. "The safest general characteri-
zation of the European philosophical tradition is that it con-
sists of a series of footnotes to Plato." Cf. also Taylor’s
splendid study of the broader influence of platonism as a whole.
Taylor, PI I.
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Plato, the Timaeus stands out as Plato's supreme attempt to fur-
nish the learned world with a seriously intended cosmology. A
basic Weltanschauung for Plato's Lebensanschauung
,
the permanent
value of the Timaeus rests in its successful presentation of a
cosmological basis for a theoretical and practical ethics for
mankind. Its theme is life, the generating principle of life--
not merely the life of one man or even of humanity, but the
genesis Tov- iravTos » a fit subject for any philosopher. ± 'J
10. Cf. Bury, Tim.
,
27C.
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ABSTRACT OR THE THESIS
I. Recognizing that the Timaeus of Plato has been subjected
to a number of varying interpretations throughout the centuries,
the preliminary task facing the writer has been the determina-
tion of the basic line of argument used in the development of
the dialogue. Not wishing, however, to confine himself to a
merely subjective interpretation of Plato's metaphysics, the
writer has selected the two great modern commentaries on the
Timaeus—those of professors A. E. Taylor and F. M. Cornford—as
furnishing an excellent basis not only for a contrast and
appraisal of variant interpretations of the dialogue but as pro-
viding a stimulating background against which the writer may
offer his own attempt to deal with some of the problems raised
by plato. With each of these subsidiary problems in mind, the
writer has attacked the basic problem of this project—indeed,
the stimulating purpose of this study
— ,
i.e., a decision as to
the permanent value of Plato's Timaeus as a cosmology. In
Chapters I through IV, the method employed has been that of
analysis. Chapter V seeks to present a synoptic G-estalt of the
study as a whole.
II. Upon making an analytical survey of the argument of the
dialogue, the writer finds that Plato has used the introduction
of the work as merely the dramatic back-drop against which the
ensuing cosmological discussion is presented. The discourse
which is delivered from the lips of Timaeus is intended as a
serious St-Arr^c^fi "To-v- \oyov*,s
. This attempt to
.M • • ...
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.
•
. .
• i
.
-
/
1
T06T
interpret the universe treats the soul of the world, the prod-
ucts of reason, the things which come of necessity, the inter-
action of reason and necessity, and, finally, the significance
of the making of man.
III. Distinctive principles of interpretation on the part of
Professors Taylor and Cornford are immediately revealed in their
treatment of the historicity of the discussion portrayed in the
dialogue. Professor Taylor defends the rather radical thesis
that the cosmology presented is that of Timaeus and not the
thought of Plato himself. On the basis of this very radical
aooroach, Taylor proceeds to interpret the dialogue in terms of
Christian monotheism (particularly is this true with reference
to the demiurge. ), Pythagorean metaphysics, and the terminology
of Professor Alfred North Whitehead's twentieth-century philos-
ophy of science. Professor Cornford, in contrast, is quick to
cry "heresy" and to oppose Taylor's interpretations (particularly
those of the demiurge, the execution of the works of reason, the
world-soul, necessity or the concept of the receptacle, time,
space, and the interaction of reason and necessity in the con-
stitution of the human organism).
IV. in criticism of the varying approaches taken by Taylor
and Cornford, the writer finds that Cornford 's objection to "the
Taylorean heresy" is justified, there being no conclusive evi-
dence to prove that Timaeus either was or was not an historical
personage or that the doctrines set forth are a revival of
fifth -century Pythagoreanism. While, to be sure, there is,
..
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obviously, some sort of an attempt to adapt Empedoclean biology
to Pythagorean mathematics—this, in spite of Cornford 's attempt
to dispose of the theory in a wholesale manner--, the writer
*
finds it prudent to consider the Taylorean approach--and this,
in spite of the splendid array of scholarship--simply a possible
yet questionably probable hypothesis. To build an elaborate
argument upon the shifting sands of higher criticism is danger-
ously suspicious procedure. Taylor's attempt to retranslate
parts of the Timaeus into the Whiteheadian terminology is also
regarded with some misgivings. in this instance, Taylor has
produced more of an eisegesis than an exegesis. With reference
to the demiurge, it is found that while Taylor too often is
prone to interpret this concept in terms of Christian theism,
his view of Plato's God is much more satisfactory than the emas-
culated god of Cornford.
Dissatisfied with both the interpretations of Taylor and
Cornford of the role of persuasion as the mediating factor
between reason and necessity, and their almost complete neglect
of the ethical implications of the Timaeus
,
the writer has
attempted a fresh study of these two problems. Rational
direction is suggested as a more adequate as well as a more con-
sistent concept than the Platonic persuasion as the mediating
principle between the rational and irrational givens of the
universe. With reference to the possible ethical value of the
dialogue, the writer offers the thesis that Plato intended his
..
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metaphysics to be a foundation for moral practice. In this
sense, the Timaeus may be regarded as "a preface to morals."
V. in summary, the following findings and conclusions are
offered.
1* Plato, primarily concerned with the presentation of a
scientific-philosophical interpretation of the cosmos is, never-
theless, also a poet unable to resist the temptation to dress
his observations in the clothing of literary metaphors. it i3
thus that the Timaeus should be regarded as a cosmogonous
cosmology.
2 . The "Taylorean heresy," together with its corollaries,
is an interesting hypothesis yet is both unnecessary as well as
lacking in conclusive evidence.
3 . Taylor's view of God, while nearer to the God of Plato
than the emasculated god of Cornford is unnecessarily
Christianized.
4. Cornford' s treatment of reason and necessity is com-
mendably realistic in its willingness to face the two undeniable
"givens" of metaphysical reality without implicitly resorting
to Christian theism as the alleged Platonic solution.
5. Both Taylor and Cornford are deficient in providing
adequate studies of both persuasion, the mediating factor
between reason and necessity, and the ethical implications of
the Timaeus
.
The writer finds the principle of rational
direction to be a more adequate concept than the Platonic per-
suasion, and the importance of the ethical implications of the
..
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dialogue expressed in the phrase which would describe the
Timaeu3 as Plato's "preface to morals."
6. A basic Weltanschauung for Plato's Lebensanschauung ,
the permanent value of the Timaeus lies in its successful pres-
entation of a cosmological basis for a theoretical and practical
ethics for mankind.
..
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